Tuesday, 17 June 2014
The independence of Scotland could be a potentially serious diminution in the strategic position of the United Kingdom.
Firstly, there would be an independent nation sharing the island of Great Britain for the first time in over three centuries. Historically the French had close ties to Scotland and used Scotland as a distraction upon England.
Without going so far as to say that it will recur, I will simply limit myself to saying it can recur.
But the relative strengths of Scotland and England have grown to an enormous disparity since the Act of Union in 1707. At nearly ten times the population of Scotland, and more than ten times the GDP, England has little to fear from her northern neighbour.
What's more serious, however, is Scotland robbing England of her geographic advantages.
Currently the only nations that can circumvent England's control of Europe's coasts are Spain, Portugal, and France.
All other nations have to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar, the Straits of Dover, or through the Norwegian Sea.
If Scotland were to become independent, and, like Ireland, deny England the use of her facilities, this would tear a gaping hole in England's fortuitous position.
The northern European nations, most especially Russia and Germany, could escape into the Atlantic between Scotland and Norway whereas before they could not.
This would hugely complicate England's insular defences. Once the enemy is out into the open sea, where would he go? The answer, of course, is wherever he'd like. And it would extremely difficult to track him down.
Controlling narrow waterways is easy, hunting ships in the Atlantic is akin to finding needles in a haystack. If that haystack was 41 million square miles. And since all the oceans are connected, we're talking potentially 133 million square miles (presuming they won't sail in the Arctic for obvious reasons).
Obviously finding a ship in that vast of an area is impossible. The British would have to rely on their age old strategy of attempting to catch the enemy when he had to re-enter port. While this served Britain in good stead, as a general strategy it left much to be desired. For the Spanish and French were liable to slip through the cracks and land in Canada, in America, in Egypt, in Ireland, wherever the fuck they felt like.
Britain's control of Scotland made this impossible for Germany during the two world wars. The much more narrow waters between Scotland and Norway could be effectively patrolled and radar could pick up any activity. When the Bismarck made its sally, it was quickly found and hunted to extinction.
Scotland also provided England with superb bases for her fleets to control the North Sea, especially against Germany but also against Russia.
Rosyth on the Firth of Forth is an excellent harbour, but the real treasure is Scapa Flow. Without these, the farthest north a British fleet could dock would be the estuary of the Humber, or perhaps even as far south as the Medway.
While this would prevent the British from catching an enemy fleet, these harbours also were much less useful than Scapa.
Scapa Flow is virtually the most perfect anchorage on the planet. It has everything a navalist would need for a base. It has three narrow, easily controlled, exits leading in three different directions. One could go south, east, or west as necessary, without having to circumvent anything, and waste time thereby.
The harbour is relatively shallow, any sneak attack would not necessarily inflict total losses. The Germans scuttled their own fleet, but the British were able to drag them back up to the surface as they had not gone down that deep. The British could equally refloat their own ships if sunk in the harbour.
Another point in its favour is the fact that it's enormous. Scapa is over 120 miles square, it could dock the entire US Navy with room to spare. The entire Grand Fleet found comfortable lodgings there. This is doubly advantageous because any sudden attack would give the fleet plenty of room for evasive manoeuvres, unlike the narrow strait jackets of the Humber and the Medway.
The islands forming the harbour could easily be utilised to provide for aerodromes and drydocks to shield the fleet from aerial assault and to repair the ships if necessary.
Another superb attribute is that the islands are remote. They have a population of 21,000, which is puny. Security would be easily obtained. Unlike farther south where spies would find it easy to blend in, and where positions of the ships would be almost absurdly easy to discover.
Remoteness protects the fleet even more by vastly increasing the distance between the enemy and it. It is unlikely aircraft or ships making for Scapa would get anywhere near the anchorage before the fleet was aware. Since the distance would increase, the flying time of the enemy would also be much more limited than farther south.
For all of these reasons the British found Scapa to be a gift from God. In Portsmouth, in Chatham, in Hull, the harbours are narrow, chock full of civilian craft, and perilously close to Europe. German aircraft could cause havoc in them, and given the many civilian ships and the limited space, the ships' freedom of movement would be much restricted and their time under fire would be much increased.
Without Scapa the Germans may well have been able to sink the entire Royal Navy from the air. As it were, Scapa was too far away and too huge. The Germans based in Norway attempted to hit the fleet base but failed to cause any serious damage.
If the British were to be deprived of Scapa they might well face the prospect of having their fleet sunk by aircraft, especially if their air force were inferior to the enemy's, as the RAF was to the Germans in WWII.
The loss of Scapa could severely compromise the Home Islands. Not only would the enemies be able to enter the Atlantic, but Britain's own defences would be called into question. If a sudden French air attack sunk the fleet while it was swinging at its moorings in Portsmouth, what would there be to stop the French from landing in the Thames?
With a fleet snugly tucked away in Scapa, the risks of landings would be so great that it would be unlikely that the enemy would attempt them. Thus embodying Lord Torrington's "fleet-in-being" concept.
The map shows Scapa Flow, with the Scottish mainland to the south. The islands form a protective cocoon around the anchorage, with narrow channels allowing access and excess. Across these channels could be strung sonar booms and anti-submarine nets. On land could be based aeroplanes.
It should also be noted that the United States derives immense advantage from Britain's position, and its own influence in Europe would be diminished by the UK's loss of Scotland.