Wednesday 21 May 2014
"Her Majesty has done him a fine turn, in an interview which she has had with Rhode, the Prussian Minister, she has upset our whole system…We look pretty foolish at present, but it will have to be seen what line can still be taken to get out of it." - Joseph II to his brother Leopold
“Baron de Rhode attributes remarks to Your Majesty which are quite incredible, they destroy in a moment what has been the work of three years…Your Majesty can easily imagine what was my consternation when I read this despatch.” - Kaunitz to Maria Theresa
The foolishness of Maria Theresa revealed again. Joseph was playing a high stakes game with Kaunitz as guide. Kaunitz had the Austrian Minister in Constantinople, Thugut, sign an alliance with the Ottoman Empire which guaranteed its territorial integrity and promised Austrian support up to and including open war against Russia in order to restore the independence of the Romanian Principalities and the Crimean Khanate.
This had greatly alarmed both Prussia and Russia, who now believed that Austria would attack Russia on the side of Turkey. Prussia had been allied to Russia since 1764 and Frederick was obliged to come to Russia’s aid, which he was most eager to avoid. He did not wish to fight Austria in order that Russia may rob the Turks.
It appeared in later October, 1771, therefore, that Russian would accept the Austrian ultimatum. That Russia would not secure the southern shore of the Black Sea, that the Turks would make settling the Ukraine impossible by encouraging raids from the Crimean Tatars, and that Russia would remain far away from the Danube.
Until Maria Theresa met with Baron de Rhode who was Prussian Minister to Vienna and let slip that Austria hadn’t the strength to fight Prussia and had managed to only muster 50,000 men on the Danube. Which essentially amounted to a confession that Austria was bluffing. Which Russia and Prussia immediately called and put Austria in a very serious position.
As you can read from the excerpts, the emperor and his chancellor were none too happy with this business, and once again Maria Theresa’s timidity and total inability to understand diplomacy resulted in her country’s loss.
Joseph had written to Leopold;
“The King of Prussia, with 20,000 men, can conquer them (Bohemia and Moravia) without a battle, and our whole army, from lack of supplies, and owing to the impossibility of collecting them, will have to escape over the Danube.”
Nonetheless Joseph was intelligent enough to realise that the Prussians and Russians were not aware of this weakness. The Russians themselves were petrified of Austrian forces cutting them off by seizing the line of the Pruth. Frederick was only too aware of his repeated failures to take Bohemia, which he would do one more time before his death, and did not consider it in his power to rescue the Russian Army as Austria could simply stand on the defensive in Bohemia while taking the offensive in Romania to destroy the Russian Army there. This made Russia willing to negotiate over both Poland and Turkey, which Prussia greatly desired and worked towards in order to avoid entangling itself in an Austro-Russian War from which it could gain nothing.
But as usual, Maria Theresa was afraid. She got cold feet and backed down. Little did she know that Russia and Prussia were bluffing her, and instead of matching their bluff as Kaunitz and Joseph were doing, she folded. Austria was forced to accept not only that Russia would annex Azov and establish itself on the Black Sea, and declare a protectorate over the Crimea which was to be directly annexed in 1783, but that Russia and Prussia were also going to help themselves to slices of Poland which Austria had intended to protect.
But Joseph’s flexibility allowed him to make the best of the situation. What line he took to “get out of it” was to join Russia and Prussia in devouring Poland, since he could not protect it, he at least ensured that he obtained the largest share, and additionally seized the Bukovina which would allow the Austrians in the future to intervene more effectively in Moldavia through the Radna and Borsa Passes connecting Transylvania with Moldaiva, which would also strengthen their position in Poland should the Jablunka or Dukla Passes be lost farther west.
Still, this was very much a “second best” option. Austria’s true interests were in maintaining the integrity of both Poland and Turkey, but she patently failed. And that she did so was not only because of Austrian weakness but because of French weakness. Russia’s policy was ever to keep the Germans divided. Prussia had been France’s ally so Russia joined with Austria against her. This drove Prussia into the arms of Britain, for the moment, and Austria unexpectedly joined with France. Peter III of Russia reversed this, however. As an admirer of Frederick the Great he made an alliance with Prussia in 1762.
Already it was clear that Prussia was the Sardinia of the north and that she didn’t care who protected her possession of Silesia. Prussia went from France, to Britain, to Russia, whoever shielded her from Austrian vengeance at the time.
Austria was above all interested in gaining Silesia or some equal compensation in Germany (Bavaria). Russia had hoped to gain Austrian assistance in dismembering Poland and Turkey, but Austria would have none of this. It was increasingly taking the side of these two powers to keep Russia from her own frontiers. Russia therefore naturally intended to use Prussia against Austria. Prussia would cancel Austria out letting Russia gain Poland and Turkey, or so it was hoped, and the threat of Russia would ensure that Austria could not attack Silesia nor interfere in Germany which served Prussia.
Faced by this Prusso-Russo alliance Austria was very much in an inferior position. And so Austria leant on France. France had always been the traditional protector of Turkey and Poland, and since 1756 the ally of Austria against Prussia, as France, like Russia, also sought to keep the Germans divided. So Austria’s trump card was the intervention of France against Prussia while she stood on the defensive and took the offensive against Russia in Romania. Frederick greatly feared this. He would have to fight both Austria and France on account of Russia’s desire to annex the Crimea, which he was absolutely adamant should never happen.
But it all fell apart. Choiseul’s Ministry in France fell, and the French, already greatly weakened, withdrew decisively from Eastern European affairs. Kaunitz and Joseph failed to obtain a declaration from Paris that France would march on Prussia if Prussia marched on Austria.
This first great relief for Frederick was followed by the second great relief of Maria Theresa admitting that Austria was too weak to fight Prussia and Russia in combination without France. And so the Austro-French policy of protecting Turkey and Poland was an abject failure.
This decisively convinced Joseph that France was worthless as an ally and so he abandoned France for Russia, seeking to use Russia against Prussia, but that’s a story for another day.
It should be noted that Frederick was very unwarlike, ironically enough. His alliance with France in 1740 was meant to take Silesia and his repeated interventions in the Austrian Succession War were meant to secure it. Traun’s crossing of the Rhine would likely have resulted in Cumberland defeating the French in Belgium. If that happened France would likely drop out of the war and Prussia would face victorious Austria alone. So Frederick re-entered the war to draw the Austrians out of Alsace.
In 1745 Prussia won at Hohenfriedeberg over Austria and France won at Fontenoy over Britain and the Dutch combined. These twin defeats ensured that the coalition would achieve nothing and Frederick would keep Silesia. Austria intended to stay in the war until she got Silesia back, but France’s victories in Belgium where Saxe took every fortress and even captured Maastricht in the Dutch Republic compelled the British to make peace.
Unable to fight without British assistance, as that would unleash France, Austria reluctantly accepted peace alongside Britain at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. Thus far Frederick’s diplomacy had succeeded wildly, he took Silesia and kept it. But as France drew into another war with Britain Frederick sought to remain out of it with what he considered a clever technique. He guaranteed to neutralise the empire with Britain at the Treaty of Westminster, pledging to protect Hanover. But he exempted Belgium from this protection. It was clear what he intended to do.
If France attacked Hanover it would be resisted by Prussia, who due to proximity could render a fair amount of assistance. But if France were to attack Belgium, Prussia would be neutral and since Austria was distant it would be hard put to defend it. This was intended to push France into war with Austria, who would presumably be joined by Britain, and thus allow Prussia to stay out. Instead France joined forces with Austria as it was highly irritated that Prussia would seek to defend Hanover, and becaue Lous XV had his own clever bit of diplomacy whereby if Austria succeeded in taking Silesia, which seemed likely with French and Russian help, then Austria would give the French Belgium in return without France having to fight for it. Instead of pushing France against Austria and cancelling them both out, Frederick’s clumsy diplomacy instead united them against him as Austria was no longer worried about French or Russian intervention on Prussia’s side.
Having discussed the weakness of the Austro-French coalition and the ascendancy of the Prusso-Russian coalition in regards to the first partition of Poland and the concurrent Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774, it is time to discuss this theme further with the events of the late 1770s.
In 1777 the Bavarian Elector Maximilian III Joseph died without issue. Joseph II of Austria as the husband of the late Elector’s wife claimed the inheritance of Bavaria, strengthening this with declarations as emperor. The late elector’s closest male relative, Charles Theodore the Elector Palatine, was to divide Bavaria with Austria. This was ratified by convention and by the late summer of 1777 Austrian forces had taken occupation of much of Bavaria.
Prussia immediately rejected this, stating that the emperor was trampling upon the rights of the German Princes as guaranteed by the Imperial Constitution. Consequently Prussia mobilised and invaded Bohemia. With about 80,000 men Prince Henry of Prussia, the king’s brother, moved through the Tollenstein-Lilienstein Gate following the valley of the Elbe, while Frederick the Great himself led some 85,000 men over the Nachod Gate to reach the left (east) bank of the Upper Elbe.
Between them stood the main Austrian army of about 180,000 between the Elbe and the Iser commanded by the emperor in person. Joseph’s central position was unassailable, the Prussians were reduced to scraping up food from the countryside, earning the War of the Bavarian Succession the nickname of “the Potato War” as the only real fighting was between Check peasants and Prussian soldiers over potatoes. After losing nearly a quarter of his men to starvation and disease, exacerbated by the weather, Frederick abandoned Bohemia, essentially defeated without even a fight (Traun would have been proud).
This was a disaster of the first magnitude for Prussia. It had failed entirely to damage Austria. Frederick’s hopes were to defeat the Austrians in Bohemia in order to compel them to abandon Bavaria. Instead the Austrians ruined him in Bohemia and remained firmly in possession of Bavaria. Prussia had failed militarily.
But now it was to win diplomatically. Typically enough Maria Theresa negotiated behind her son’s back. While Joseph was characteristically risking his person in the front lines his mother was begging Frederick to take precautions so that Joseph would not be struck by a stray bullet (as if any human could guarantee that). Apart from her natural maternal instincts to prevent the untimely death of her eldest son, she was afraid for the Monarchy as a whole. She believed that if Frederick attacked Joseph that Austria would again be defeated by the Prussians and forced to humiliating concessions. Far away in Vienna, and with a lifetime of defeats at Frederick’s hands, she may perhaps be justified in this view.
On the ground Joseph and the senior Austrian commanders Ernst Gideon von Laudon and Franz Moritz von Lacy were of an entirely different, and much more correct, opinion. Nevertheless Maria Theresa overruled them, especially since Joseph was not able to influence policy to any meaningful degree while at the front. He was, in fact, kept entirely in the dark. When he learned of his mother’s betrayal, again, he was so furious he immediately declared his intention to abdicate, which he was only persuaded from doing with great difficulty by Kaunitz.
Apart from the predictable timidity of the empress, there were other currents flowing against Austria. Prussia demanded Russian assistance as per the treaty of 1762, which Catherine the Great at last decided to honour. Austria was told to accept Russian mediation or else Russia would enter the war against her. Joseph, arrogant by nature and not immune from typical Teutonic disdain for the Slavs, did not think much of Russia. By mid-1778 Joseph had raised the army to a paper strength of about 330,000, and had no doubts that he could defend the passes of the Carpathians against Russia with one army while holding the Prussians in Silesia with another.
What ruined this hope was the attitude of France. Once more France proved the supreme worthlessness of its alliance. As the traditional protector of Bavaria, France was none too happy to see Bavaria dismembered. France undermined Austria’s diplomacy and even threatened to enter the war against her by opening operations in the Austrian Netherlands. Joseph didn’t think much of this either, having an even lower opinion of France than of Russia, but he did not deem it prudent to fight three powers at once while his mother was meanwhile actively cutting the ground from under his feet. As much as his consternation and frustration must have been, he accepted Russian mediation and the War of the Bavarian Succession came to an end with total Austrian defeat even though Prussia’s army had performed absolutely pathetically. Diplomacy had triumphed where might had failed.
Joseph was no idiot and decided this must be reversed. Vacillating and treacherous France had ruined his plans for the second time in less than ten years. His own mother had ruined his plans. And the close connexion between Berlin and St. Petersburg was obviously much more effective than the absurd disharmony between Vienna and Paris. Joseph therefore decided that France was to be ignored, while Vienna was to win over St. Petersburg and thereby isolate Berlin. Once this was achieved Austria could use Russia to gain Silesia or Bavaria, the latter of which Joseph now intended to trade for the Austrian Netherlands in a revived project stretching back to the 1710s which would rid the Monarchy of a strategic Achilles’ Heel and reduce the ability of France to blackmail him.
Joseph thereupon induced the heir presumptive of Bavaria, the Duke of Zweibrücken, to negotiate along these lines. The duke was a proligate spender and was in serious debt. Joseph pressured him to accept the exchange of Bavaria for the Austrian Netherlands in return for a royal title (“King of Burgundy”) and for Austria repaying his debts. This scheme was foiled by France who payed Zweibrücken’s debts and agreed to support his inheritance of Bavaria, the Palatinate, and still retain Zweibrücken thereby outbidding Austria.
Thwarted in this Joseph decisively turned to Russia. In 1780 Joseph travelled to the Black Sea coast to meet Catherine in person. In 1781 the Austro-Russian alliance was secured. The convention specified that if Austria were attacked by Prussia, or Russia by Turkey, than the other would come to its assistance. Joseph apparently considered it much more likely that Prussia would attack him than the eventuality of Turkey attacking Russia, and had been careful to leave himself free in case Russia were the aggressor.
Unfortunately Joseph was soon after caught up in the Kettle War against the Dutch in his attempt to open the Scheldt and revive the prosperity of the Ostend Company with a nearly identical Antwerp Company in 1784. It seems his intention was to alarm France with Austrian activity so near her borders, which included declaring war on the Dutch Republic which was formally under French protection. Michael Hochedlinger conjectures this was to encourage France to accept the exchange of Bavaria for Belgium, removing the Austrians from her borders, and the increased commercial prosperity was additionally intended to entice the Bavarian Elector to trade his lands for much more lucrative prospects.
Joseph’s problems were ever his reckless ambition, he tried too much too quickly. His plans were too grandiose and relied on too many factors. His business in Belgium seems to have been aimed at forcing the issue over Bavaria, which would bring Prussia against him and this time Joseph would be in an invincible position as Russia would be on his side and France would be unable to attack him in Belgium, as that would be independent under the Bavarian Elector. A very elaborate and complex diplomatic plan. Naturally, as such things go, it was too clever and relied on too many variables. The Dutch were not bullied into opening the Scheldt, the Antwerp Company collapsed. Unimpressed with this the Bavarian Elector remained staunchly committed to retaining his hereditary lands. Frustrated Joseph agreed to peace with Holland in 1785.
Catherine was to dupe the emperor with her own plan. Far less complex than Joseph’s, the alliance was to serve her purposes. Joseph had paid the price for Russian assistance against Prussia by promising Austrian assistance against Turkey. As noted, Joseph had been very careful to add the clause that Austria would only join Russia against the Porte if the Ottoman Empire attacked Russia. Joseph apparently did not consider this possibility very likely, as Russia was greatly the stronger party and the Turks would be fools to initiate a war themselves, which they could not possibly win.
In 1783, shortly after the signing of the Austro-Russian alliance Catherine attempted to force the issue by having Rumyantsev march into the Crimea, still formally independent and a protectorate of Russia, and declare it annexed to the Russian Empire. The Sultan did not rise to this provocation, though warlike feeling spread throughout the Ottoman Empire. Joseph was soon involved in his schemes for acquiring Bavaria and fighting the Dutch, and meanwhile Catherine appeared to be stumped on how to induce the Turks to attack her. Then she decided upon a clever idea.
She openly discussed partition of the Ottoman Empire with Austria. Joseph agreed to these proposals insofar as they were conditional upon the Turks attacking Russia, which he still considered improbable. Joseph absolutely refused to precipitate a war against Turkey, and imagined that he was simply leading the Russians on with wild dreams like the so-called ‘Greek Project’ while in fact promising them nothing. Catherine let these ideas leak into Constantinople, and when she embarked on an ostentatious and intentionally provocative triumphal procession across the newly won Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula in the spring of 1787, the agitation for war in Constantinople became too much. The Sultan threw the Russian Ambassador, Yakov Bulgakov, into prison and raised the horsetail banners signifying crusade against the infidel. Late in 1787 the Ottoman Empire formally declared war on the Empire of Russia.
This left the emperor absolutely dumbfounded. The indications suggest Joseph never considered the Porte declaring war on Russia a serious possibility. But now Austria could not afford to lose Russian support as France was still worthless and Joseph had still his designs on Bavaria. Russia was essential as a counterweight to Prussia, so Joseph was now obliged to pay the blood price for this alliance by upholding his end of the bargain and declaring war on the Ottoman Empire in support of Russia in early 1788, much to the contrary of his own desires and to the interests of his country. Catherine, the rude North German of low princely stock with barely a formal education, had outwitted him, the Emperor of Germany and the most brilliant Habsburg ever to occupy the Austrian throne. This can, of course, be attributed to the fact that Catherine’s diplomacy was straight to the point and practical, whereas Joseph’s was much more complex and elaborately devised. As is usually the case, the rude and the simple is superior to the intricate and the sophisticated.
Joseph had delayed declaring war on Turkey until the beginning of 1788 in order to muster sufficient forces and because he did not trust the Russians. He proved right, as the Russians were only too willing to allow Austria to bear the brunt of the war. Based at Orsova the Turks devastated the Banat while disease and enemy action took a toll on Austrian forces. The emperor was commanding in person, and was himself struck down by disease. Nonetheless Austria was able to take Belgrade, drive the Turks out of Orsova, and forces under Josias von Coburg were able to capture Bucharest, Jassy, and occupy the Danubian Principalities.
Once again, however, Joseph was to win militarily and lose diplomatically. Joseph’s intention above all was to prevent the destruction of the Ottoman Empire by Russia, and the fact that much emphasis was laid upon Coburg’s mission, to occupy the Romanian Principalities, indicates that Joseph was of the mind to prevent them from falling to Russia by occupying them himself. If he proved unable to annex them to Austria, by his occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia he could at least deny them to Russia.
Predictably enough France opposed this as best she could. Though Louis XVI acceded to Joseph’s demand to withdraw French technicians and officers from Turkish service, France was nonetheless actively working to undermine Russia and Austria. French diplomacy succeeded in inducing the Swedes to declare war on Russia in June of 1788, while the Poles with French encouragement sought to reform the Sejm and draw up a new constitution.
While Austria was generally in favour of a strong Poland, this development came at a bad time. The distractions of Sweden and Poland drew the attention of the Russians, throwing the war in the Balkans all the more on Austrian shoulders. Even worse, Prussia had joined in France’s schemes to act as a counterweight against Austria. Prussia demanded that Austria make peace with Turkey on the basis of the status quo ante. Joseph was not in a position to do this, as he could not allow the Russians to sweep into the Danubian Principalities or unilaterally gain at Turkish expense.
Instead Joseph now found himself obliged to bear the main burden of a war against the Turks which he never wanted, and additionally was forced to muster an army in Bohemia to resist the expected assault by the Prussians. Though Joseph reminded Russia that the Russians were by treaty obligated to come to Austria’s assistance against Prussia, the many distractions of Russia and the fact that Poland could no longer be traversed by the Russians at will ensured that Russia would be able to do precious little to Prussia while the burden would be again thrown on Austria.
Unrest in Hungary and Belgium was causing the Monarchy to fracture apart even while the international situation was growing critical. France’s Revolution in 1789 was little consolation, as France had already set the wheels in motion. It was in this crucial time that the broken, defeated, and depressed Emperor Joseph II died in February of 1790 at the age of forty-nine. He was succeeded by his brother Leopold.
Leopold possessed considerable diplomatic acumen and sought to extricate Austria from her present crisis. Leopold’s prudent decision to withdraw the more offensive of Joseph’s reforms conciliated the Hungarians. At Reichenbach in July of 1790 he agreed to the Prussian demands of ending the war against the Turks without territorial acquisitions.
Something extraordinary then happened. Diplomacy had been based on the enmity between Vienna and Berlin since 1740, and both France and Russia exploited the division between them to further their own gain. See earlier how Russia used the threat of Prussia to force Austria to accept Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774 which pushed the Russian frontier to the Southern Bug and virtually doomed the Crimean Khanate. But at Reichenbach the two German powers unexpectedly united.
By agreeing to the Prussian conditions over Turkey, which Prussia was itself increasingly seeing as valuable, the Austrians gained Prussian assistance in quelling the ‘United States of Belgium’ which had declared independence from Austria in January of 1790, and which now with Prussian help the Austrians reconquered by December of the same year.
The united declarations of Austria and Prussia compelled Russia to peace with Turkey too. In August of 1791 Austria signed the Treaty of Sistova with the Ottoman Empire which only gained Orsova for the Monarchy while relinquishing all of Austria’s other considerable gains, most notably the Danubian Principalities and Belgrade, the former which nonetheless would remain under Austrian occupation until peace with Russia had be achieved. The alignment of Austria and Prussia had caused Russia to make peace with Sweden in August of 1790 with the Treaty of Värälä stipulating no gains for either side. And Austria’s leaving the war against the Turks and uniting with Prussia resulted in Russia agreeing to the Treaty of Jassy making peace with Turkey in January of 1792 which severely limited Catherine’s much more ambitious pretensions to simply pushing the Russian frontier from the Bug to the Dniester (where Russia was to build the great port of Odessa in 1794), and formally annexing the Crimea which de facto had been the case since 1783. Austria’s separate peace in defiance of her treaty obligations was considered by Russia as the end of their alliance.
Before that had happened, the Austrians had made the Declaration of Pillnitz in August, 1791, on behalf of the entire empire. Following this gesture and the attempted flight of the royal family from Paris, the French believed the Austrians were behind a plot to unite Europe’s crowned heads against France. Consequently France declared war on Austria in late April, 1792, beginning the French Revolutionary Wars.
Prussia and Austria together undertook to lead a German crusade against the French Republic, but this was halted at Valmy in September which saved Paris. And afterwards the Austrians were defeated at Jemappes in November which caused their rapid collapse in the Netherlands for the time being.
While the Germans were thus distracted the Russians had taken advantage of the situation by invading Poland to start the so-called ‘War in Defence of the Constitution’ in late May, 1792. Austria desired to resist this and support Poland against Russia which Prussia itself had promised to do in a treaty signed with Poland on 29 March, 1790.
But the union of Prussia and Austria was over. Almost before they had united they split again. Russia was able to split Prussia from Austria by agreeing to another partition of Poland that excluded Austria, while also underwriting Prussian demands at the expense of France. This new Second Partition of Poland greatly annoyed Austria, who realised the implications of Prussian treachery. Austria now revived the project to exchange Belgium for Bavaria, as in 1793 the Austrians under Coburg were able to regain the Netherlands after early March of 1793. Austria sought other schemes in addition, seizing Alsace and Lorraine from France to exchange for Bavaria, having high hopes of victory. Coburg soon crossed the French frontier to take a number of forts including Valenciennes. Meanwhile another Austrian army under the command of Dagobert von Wurmser stormed the Wissembourg lines and entered Alsace.
Unfortunately for Austria Coburg was decisively defeated at Fleurus and Belgium again fell under French control, this time for good. While Wurmser was defeated at Second Wissembourg turning the tables on the Allies again. The French overran Holland, and invaded Western Germany. Russia’s cleverness was again revealed. In March, 1794 the Kościuszko Uprising began in Poland. Catherine now decided to destroy Poland, and to do this she bought Austria with promises of territorial gain. The inability of the Germans to effectively unite had allowed Russia to gobble up Poland. Granted Russia would have been better off retaining her protectorate and sharing the spoils with the Germans was an indication of weakness, but Austria and Prussia had shown alarming support for the restitution of a powerful and independent Poland. It was more convenient for Russia to divide the Germans and play them off than to fight them across Poland.
Austrian desire for revenge and compensation from the last partition largely drove her to agreement with Russia. Prussia was presented with a fait accompli being left the scraps after Russia and Austria had taken their share. Most particular Austria took Cracow which was claimed by Prussia in October of 1795.
France too was exploiting the latent rivalry between Austria and Prussia. The Prussians were as disappointed by the failure of the German crusade against Jacobinism as the Austrians were, for their schemes were also foiled. Austria’s designs on Bavaria and the repayment of Prussia’s own betrayal in Poland with a betrayal of her own disillusioned Berlin. Prussia deserted the coalition against France by the terms of the Treaty of Basel in August, 1795.
This disunity was hugely exposing the German powers to their enemies. Despite both being united in opposing Russia in Poland and even over the Ottoman Empire, the Germans had patently failed to protect either from Russia as the Russians played them off against each other. Now they proved unable to prevent the spoliation of the Germany itself and the loss of the left (west) bank of the Rhine to France. Austria was compelled to the peace table in 1797 after their major defeat in Italy by the young Napoleon Bonaparte. Austria with Russia would make war on France again in 1798, but France was able to exploit their differences by playing on Austrian greed.
Austria at Campo Formio took the majority of the territory belonging to the Republic of Venice. Joseph II had cast aspiring eyes on Venice and had demanded it as additional compensation for Russia’s chimerical plans against the Ottoman Empire. While Joseph did not consider Russia’s grandiose designs to likely unfold, he was still very serious about acquiring Venice. This was achieved in 1797 and justified as compensation for Austria’s absence during the Second Polish Partition.
Thugut’s ideas during the War of the Second Coalition were to indemnify Austria’s losses in Germany by taking territory in Italy, which could be traded for Salzburg and Berchtesgaden. Czar Paul of Russia wanted no part in such cynical horse-trading. He insisted that the Italian rulers be restored to their pre-war positions. This ultimately caused a total breach and the removal of the Russians from the war in 1799. Austria was again defeated after Napoleon’s timely arrival at Hohenlinden in Germany and Marengo in Italy.
While Prussia and Russia had no use for Austria’s Italian ambitions the growth of French power was seriously alarming them. In 1802 the French made peace with Britain at Amiens and it seemed as if France was at her pinnacle. Spain had defected to her side in 1796, Russia had dropped out of the war in 1799, recalling the great Suvorov and his corps home. Prussia had not taken up arms against her since the Peace of Basel in 1795. Austria was bludgeoned into submission at Lunéville in 1801. Finally Britain was brought to the table at Amiens in 1802.
None of the powers were satisfied with these arrangements. Britain and France were soon at war again over Malta and Egypt, which they refused to evacuate as agreed. In 1804 Napoleon had himself crowned by the Pope as Emperor of the French. He had already decided upon the invasion of Great Britain and had gathered the French army on the Channel coast at Boulogne facing England.
William Pitt was no fool and sought desperately to divert the French from their enterprise. While in October 1805 the combined Spanish and French fleets under Villeneuve were defeated west of Cadiz by the British under Lord Nelson at Trafalgar, ending the French threat of invasion, Napoleon had already been called away. The Austrians had declared war, sweeping their main forces under Archduke Charles into Italy, while their army in Germany under Karl Mack von Leiberich established itself on the Iller near Ulm, after having taken control of Bavaria.
Russia under its new, Czar Alexander I, decided to join forces with Austria despite the latter’s reputation. British diplomacy succeeded in forming a rickety partnership, but this partnership was missing a key third wheel. Prussia. Napoleon had succeeded in playing the Germans against each other once again. He promised Prussia Hanover, which he also promised to restore to Britain, and several other things besides. But for the moment the Prussians were being dragged along to declare neutrality in order that they may obtain Hanover from France.
That they fell for such a ruse is hard to believe, but it is so. The French broke camp at Boulogne and marched east, crossing the Lower Rhine in Northwest Germany, where Prussia offered no opposition fatally exposing the Austrians on the Iller, and getting in between Mack and the Austrian border at Ulm. He was surrounded and destroyed. The Austrians retreated into their own lands where Napoleon followed, capturing Vienna and then proceeded up the Morava valley to Austerlitz, where the Austrians joined with the Russians and were defeated in combination on 2 December, 1805. Russia retreated across Poland, Austria was finished, forced to accept the Treaty of Preßburg.
Not long after this Napoleon formed the Confederation of the Rhine under his own leadership and abolished the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. Francis II proclaimed himself Emperor Francis I of Austria. Prussia was highly alarmed by this development and saw too late the preponderance of France in Germany. In addition it was clear that Napoleon had lied to Prussia about Hanover, which France instead intended to form into a new Kingdom of Westphalia for his brother Jerome (it’s ironic that Bismarck would later deceive Napoleon’s nephew with a very similar ruse to ensure his neutrality, described below). Prussia consequently went to war on its own against Napoleon.
It was very foolish decision. Without Austria to divert the French south, and with Russia still licking its wounds, the entire victorious French army together with its allies in Germany marched on Prussia whose army was utterly annihilated by Napoleon at Jena-Auerstädt on 14 October, 1806. Thoughout the end of the year and into 1807 Napoleon marched through Poland to grapple with the Russians who were defeated at Eylau and Friedland in June near the River Niemen, at which point Alexander came to terms with France at Tilsit.
However much Vienna secretly relished the destruction of Prussia, this did not bode well for Austria. There was now nothing to protect Austria’s right flank in Germany, and Russian alignment with France was yet more bitter pills to swallow. Russia had already been at war with the Ottoman Empire since 1806, which Austria was none too excited about. Prussia’s destruction removed all hope of restraining either Russia or France. Austria could now do nothing but wait.
While Cobenzl and Archduke Charles tried to reform the army, Napoleon got into his serious Spanish escapade in 1808, where a French army under Pierre Dupont was isolated and destroyed at Bailén by the Spaniards in July. This greatly encouraged Austria who prepared to re-enter the struggle against France.
Austria commenced hostilities against France in the beginning of April, 1809, but had seriously miscalculated. The emperor had made proclamations seeking to raise Germany against Napoleon, but he was dangerously isolated. This summon fell on deaf ears, the Germans did not follow the Spanish example, remaining loyal to their princes, who in their turn remained loyal to France. Prussia did not budge, weak and useless as she was. Russia too made no move. Austria was entirely alone, her diplomacy having been very badly handled.
Nonetheless Austria was able to field impressive numbers and achieve impressive victories. Though Vienna again fell, Napoleon himself was defeated by Archduke Charles at Aspern, Napoleon’s first battlefield defeat. Though the French at last won at Wagram, the Austrians had fought so well that Napoleon was now seriously worried about their involvement in war against him. He now sought to win Vienna to his side by moderate conditions coupled with his marriage into the Habsburg family and an alliance between France and Austria.
Despite this seemingly strange reverse in policy, it was quite beneficial to both sides. Austria was still determined to prevent the Ottoman Empire from being gobbled up by Russia, and now Napoleon too was aiming to restrain Russia in the Balkans. Alliance with France protected Austria from a Prussian resurgence and any further greed of the newly dignified crowns of Southern Germany who had already feasted upon Austrian territory with France. Napoleon for his part of course intended that Austria should be used as a buffer against Russia and to keep Germany divided.
Napoleon was already seriously annoyed with Alexander. The Czar had failed to honour his agreement to tie down Austria by mobilising a corps on the border of Galicia, allowing Austria to go to war in 1809. Alexander also had yet to make peace with the Turks on a suitable basis as he had pledged at Tilsit in 1807. In 1810 Russia ceased enforcing the Continental System which infuriated Napoleon further. It was clear where Russia’s loyalties lay. With Britain, and against France.
Consequently Napoleon opted to destroy Russia. This began his ill-fated attack on the Eastern European colossus which for the moment had the backing of all Germany including Austria. Alexander hastily made peace with the Turks in 1812 to meet the impending assault. He took Bessarabia pushing the Russian border from the Dniester (reached by the Treaty of Jassy in 1792) to the Pruth. Alexander had also made war on Sweden to take Finland in 1809, thus securing himself from a Swedish attack which France had used in the past to weaken Russia (as during 1788-1790).
Napoleon was still wildly successful. He marched straight to the heart of Russia, taking Moscow and defeating Kutuzov at Borodino. But he failed to pin down the Czar and the Russian Army was still intact. He seems to have intended to winter in Moscow, but a great fire destroyed the city with most of its shelter and provisions. There was now no longer enough food or shelter in Moscow to house the army, Napoleon had to retreat back the Germany. This retreat proved to be one of history’s great disasters.
When the French Army finally reached East Prussia it was a shadow of its former self. Prussia immediately declared war on France to side with Russia. Russian forces for the moment were able to liberate East Prussia and conquer Napoleon’s Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but lack of supplies and stiffening French resistance slowed their advance down.
In 1813 Napoleon defeated the Russians at Bautzen and Lützen, secured Silesia and anchored his position on Saxony. Austria had yet to join against him. At this time Metternich was as worried about Prussia and Russia as he was about France. Therefore Austria offered to mediate should Napoleon accept the Rhine as the frontier of France and restore all conquests beyond it. He refused. Napoleon had one last chance to take advantage of German rivalry and missed it. Metternich reluctantly declared war on France in 1813 leading to Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig.
After Leipzig the French Emperor slipped back over the Rhine and by the beginning of 1814 was fighting on French soil. Despite the major differences between the warring parties, the two German powers and Russia remained solidly united until at last Napoleon was overthrown.
This brings us to the Congress of Vienna, a watershed in Europe’s history but most particularly for our thesis here. Prussia and Russia formed a bloc opposed more loosely by Austria, France, and Britain. Alexander insisted upon keeping the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which Austria was to be indemnifed for by taking Venetia and Lombardy in Italy. Prussia was to be indemnified by taking over half of Saxony. While it may seem Metternich was forced to agree to these exchanges against his will, they were very much to his advantage.
Prussian and Austrian Poland had been hugely reduced and given to Russia. This now united them in the east against the Russian colossus. Increasingly they were uniting over the Ottoman Empire too, whose continued existence was as long ago as 1762 considered useful to Frederick the Great when he attempted to get the Turks to attack Austria. In the west it was the same. Prussia, separated from its newly enlarged Rhenise territories was on the front line against France. Since France was much the stronger Prussia relied upon Austrian help in this sector. Now it became clear that wars between the German powers would have to be proscribed.
If the two fell into a war with one another, that would allow Russia to march on the Turks with impunity, or even to march farther into Poland at Austrian or Prussia expense. Additionally it would allow the French to march into Italy against Austria, or even worse to strike Prussia on the Rhine. Prussia’s fate was now tied to Austria’s.
What may be termed the Reichenbach Coalition was thus, almost imperceptibly, reformed by Metternich. His programme was now German unity in both east and west, curbing France’s pretensions as well as Russia’s, which for a brief moment in the 1790s had already been achieved. This time, however, Prussia found itself unable to wiggle out and betray Austria.
Prussia’s meteoric rise, like Sardinia’s, had been based on changing allies to suit circumstances. Thus Prussia was considered a wild card, siding with Russia, France, Austria, Turkey, or Sardinia as the circumstances required. Though Prussia found Austrian protection useful in the 1790s, Prussia’s greed compelled her king to seek gains offered by others. These were no longer an option. Poland was gone. Russia could no longer divide the Germans by alternatively throwing them scraps of Poland’s carcass. France could no longer buy Prussia with offers on the Rhine, for now France held nothing and was unlikely to take anything against Austrian and Prussian resistance. Austria, furthermore, was no longer a hostage to France with its Belgian provinces, and no longer aroused Prussian suspicion with projects to exchange territory for Bavaria.
So a solid German Bloc had been created by Metternich, though the Prussians at the time seem to have been unaware, still drawn closer to Russia than to Austria. In time they would realise. But for the moment Austria, Russia, and Prussia remained formally allied, though Russia again leaned towards Austria more than towards Prussia. In 1848 the Russians assisted Haynau in crushing the Hungarian Revolution, and Prussia’s thirst for challenging Austria in Germany was cooled by Russia’s opposition leading to the Punctation of Olmütz in 1850.
Yet if Russia intended to divide the Germans by favouring Austria, she made a very serious blunder. In 1854 the Russians declared war on Turkey and proceeded to occupy the Danubian Principalities. Russia had proposed partition with Britain, and now with Austria too. Both categorically refused. Czar Nicholas I was stunned by Austria’s reaction, even though it was consistent with Austrian policy since the 1690s.
Prussia’s attitude was more ambiguous than Austria’s. It carefully sailed through the storm without offending anybody. Secretly Prussia shared Austrian sentiments. Preservation of the Ottoman Empire was a goal of Prussian policy as much as it was Austria’s, as revealed at Reichenbach. Additionally Prussian interest in Turkey had been steadily growing, by the 1820s there were Prussian officers in the Turkish military seeking to reform and strengthen the Turks, including the young Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke, who saw action on the Turkish side in the Russo-Turkish War of 1826-1829. These are not the actions of a disinterested power, they clearly reveal that Prussia intended to pull the Turks out of their decadence with a little bit of Prussian iron.
Nonetheless Prussia allowed the Austrians to rattle the sabre for them while she stayed quiet. Though it can hardly be argued that this was part of Prussia’s grand plan, it was sensible at the time. Austria did Prussia’s dirty work for her and all of Russia’s hatred was thrown at Vienna, sparing Berlin. This was to be useful later.
After Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War in 1856 the French and Sardinians plotted to expel Austria from Italy. In 1859 this was achieved after victory at Magenta and Solferino. Austria had attempted to mobilise Germany against France, but Prussia now revealed its hand by demanding Austrian recognition of Prussian supremacy north of the River Main in return for Prussian assistance against France on the Rhine. Francis Joseph rejected this unconditionally and terminated his war in Italy in order to concentrate on Germany.
This enters the final phase of German disunity. Francis Joseph summoned the German Princes to Frankfurt in August 1863 seeking to cement Austrian leadership of Germany. Prussia’s King William I most reluctantly did not attend on the insistence of Bismarck. Prussian rejected Austria’s tacit supremacy and the two powers drifted closer to war. They were interrupted by Denmark’s silly attempt to annex the Duchies of Slesvick and Holstein in 1864. This united Austria and Prussia against Denmark in 1864, which of course ended in rapid Danish defeat.
While Austria and Prussia for the moment occupied the Duchies themselves, Prussia sought to annex them in opposition to Austria’s desire to award them to the Duke of Holstein, Frederick VIII. Not surprisingly Prussia threw obstacles in the way of this plan, which finally resulted in Austria proposing a motion against Prussia in the German Confederation in a bid to force Prussia to accept Austria’s demands in 1866.
Prussia declared the German Confederation dissolved and went to war against Austria. Bismarck had foreseen this development and so had skillfully negotiated an alliance with the new Kingdom of Italy formed after Austrian defeat there in 1861. This critically divided the Austrians between two widely separated fronts. Though they won in Italy they lost in Bohemia, and Francis Joseph was eager to end the war. France had threatened intervention, seeking to play the Germans off against each other in order to make off with Luxemburg and perhaps Belgium.
This meddling by France convinced Bismarck of the wisdom of ending the war against Austria, who was made to surrender no territory and was left entirely intact, except for having to cede Venetia to Italy. Once again Austria had been outdone by Prussian diplomacy, for Francis Joseph could have surrendered Venetia to Italy willingly in order neutralise the Italian sector and concentrate on Germany, but he would not do it. Austria’s weaknesses in this regard would be highlighted at a later date, when enemies could freely offer other powers Austrian territory which Austria naturally was much more reluctant to grant.
But for our purposes the Germans were once again splintered. This was the chance that Russia and France had been waiting for, or so they imagined. France now sought to crush an isolated Prussia and thereby restore her supremacy in Europe. Russia guaranteed Prussia against an Austrian attack and so sought to expand in the Balkans while Prussia was pushed against France.
Both powers had been duped, however. Russia was not prepared to fight Turkey in 1870, while France, though she did not know it, was not prepared to fight Prussia. Prussia achieved a startling and rapid victory over France in late 1870-early 1871. Russia took the opportunity to annul the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and declare the Black Sea once more a Russian lake. Austria could make no objections.
France, drifting closer and closer to war with Prussia since the Luxemburg Crisis in early 1867, put out feelers to Austria seeking an alliance against Prussia. The Ministry of von Beust was entirely in sympathy with this idea, wishing to gain revenge on Prussia. It seemed as if 1756 had come around all over again. But this time Russia was a much more significant factor, it was far closer, and Prussia’s destruction was not at all in its interests. Russia needed Prussia to cancel out Austrian opposition in the Balkans, thus Russia mobilised a large army in Poland declaring that she would strike Austria should Austria strike Prussia. This contributed greatly to Austria’s decision to remain neutral in 1870, and France too failed to exploit the brief window of German disunity.
The defeat of France and the consequent unification of Germany by Prussia placed France in eternal opposition to Prussia. Bismarck’s programme was now the isolation of France, which had been the same as Metternich’s programme half a century earlier. He therefore recreated our Reichenbach Coalition after only five years of being divided. This change was not immediately perceived by the rest of Europe.
Russia at last was ready to march on the Ottoman Empire in 1877, which she imagined was the final contest that would end Turkey once and for all. Russia naturally anticipated the resistance of Austria, but Alexander II seems to have felt he could rely on latent enmity between Vienna and Berlin to cancel out Austrian interference. If so, he was horribly mistaken.
1878 saw Russia totally vanquish the Turks, take Adrianople, and reach the lines of Chataldja on the outskirts of Constantinople. At San Stefano the Russians imposed a draconian peace on the Turks robbing them of virtually the entire remaining Ottoman Empire in Europe and resurrecting Bulgaria as a monstrosity in the Balkans.
Austria declared that it would not endure this. Russia was not concerned, until Germany unexpectedly threw its weight behind Austria and invited the powers to a Congress in Berlin. The opposition of Germany and Austria together ruined Russia’s pretensions. The Ottoman Empire was restored to most of its territory except for a much smaller rump Bulgaria and a few border districts ceded to Greece and Serbia. Russia’s total victory over the Turks, tantalisingly so close, was undone by the union of Berlin and Vienna that had been restored after 1871.
Germany and Austria would enter into the Dual Alliance in 1879, the aims henceforth being to keep Russia and France separated and isolated. Austria would not assist France against Germany, and Germany would not assist Russia against Austria. Both would oppose the two flanking powers wherever they might seek to expand where this conflicted with the interests of one of the two German powers. The success of this resulted in peace for nearly fifty years.
France remained a powerful factor for much of this period. It was nearly the equal of Germany in GDP and in population. But by the 1890s it was clearly beginning to lag behind. As German economic and demographic growth outstripped France, the same was happening between Russia and Austria. Austria’s relative position vis-a-vis Austria was seriously deteriorating as Russia’s population continued to explode and its economy grew by leaps and bounds. Russia conquered Central Asia, the Caucasus, and established its Far Eastern frontier on the Amur. Though it was defeated by Japan in 1904-1905 which showed that the colossus wasn’t as strong as it appeared, it was nonetheless far stronger than Austria, and beginning to alarm Germany.
Germany’s rise and especially France’s continued decline at last convinced the French that they could never again defeat Germany without help. They sought to break their isolation by uniting with Russia. Bismarck had sought to keep Russia in suspended animation with his famous Re-Insurance Treaties, but these were no longer sufficing. Russia wanted an outright alliance against Austria, or at least the promise of German neutrality in the event of an Austro-Russian War. Bismarck would not grant either. Russia therefore grasped France’s hand as it reached out to her forming the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894.
Prussia had arisen out of robbing Austria of Silesia in 1742. Austria’s sincerest desire was to regain that, or at least acquire Bavaria as compensation. Prussia would not accept this unless compelled to by force. Thus from 1742 until 1790 it was taken for granted that Austria and Prussia could be used against one another to weaken Germany, which before had been solidly opposed to French aggression. As a result Russia was able to expand deeply in the Balkans, destroy the Crimean Khanate, crush Sweden, and devour Poland. France on her side was able to seize Italy for herself, take the Low Countries, and even the left bank of the Rhine together with the domination of Germany.
The two German powers at length realised this threat, and united against it. At Reichenbach they formed a coalition to protect Turkey and Poland from Russia, and to quash Revolutionary France. This was broken by Russian diplomacy which detached Prussia with the promise of more Polish spoils. Austria in return sought Polish spoils of her own to the detriment of Prussia, which caused French diplomacy to achieve the end of the German alliance in the west as well as in the east at Basel in 1795. The end of this German unity caused the outstanding victories of Napoleon from 1796-1812 and the successes of Russia against the Turks in 1806-1812.
But it was the end of the road for them. After Austria joined Prussia and Russia in 1813, the Reichenbach Coalition was to remain in existence for all intents and purposes until 1918 except for the brief period between 1866 and 1871. The days of Russia and France exploiting German disunity to push their agenda in both Western and Eastern Europe were at an end, and eventually they realised the only way to break the German Bloc was to unite against it themselves. - Kaiser