Monday, 16 June 2014
Apologies for the length of this one, but much talk has been made of the recent developments in eastern Europe, most particularly the acquisition of the Crimea by the Russian Federation. I thought it would be useful to examine the region's history and Russia's long-standing interest in the area.
It's interesting to note the history of the Crimea. And I'm not just saying this for idle fascination, but because it gives us an window through which to view Russian foreign policy and Russia's current requirements in regards to the peninsula.
So when taking a cursory glance at a map the most immediate and obvious fact one is struck with is naturally that the Crimea juts south from the Ukraine into the Black Sea.
It should be understood what this entails.
First off it ensures that the power controlling the sea has the advantage. Being connected to the rest of the Ukraine only by the very narrow Isthmus of Perekop, the Crimea is a distinct geographic entity that generally took a different historical path than the rest of the region north of the Black Sea.
It is well known that in antiquity the Sarmatians and Scythians, now known to be Iranic-speaking tribes related distantly to the Persians, inhabited the steppes of southern Russia. But they did not inhabit the Crimea, or at least not for long.
For the Greeks established colonies at Theodosia, Eupatoria, Panticapaeum (today's Kerch), and most importantly at Tauric Chersonesus (today's Sevastopol), which was built by Greek colonists from Heraclea Pontica, on the northwest coast of Anatolia, in the fifth century B.C., twenty-five hundred years ago.
Heraclea was itself founded by the city of Megara located in a plain on the Isthmus of Corinth between the mountains of Geraneia and Pateras, whose people also founded the much more famous city of Byzantium near the Bosphorus.
But what's particularly interesting is that the Greeks also established settlements at nearly all of the other current major ports on the northern shore of the Black Sea. At Tsemes Bay, where today the city of Novorossisk lies, was Bata. At the mouth of the Southern Bug where the great shipyard of Nikolaeyev now stands, was the city of Olbia. The mouth of the Don, where Catherine the Great built the port of Rostov, was already noted as advantageous and settled by Greeks from Miletus in the third century B.C., which they called Tanais. At Ochakov was the Greek colony of Borysthenes. At Odessa was the city of Tyras.
Of all these places, the most important was Chersonesus. This was partially because it was by far the most defensible, as it lay in the mountains of the southern Crimea. But apart from its ability to be easily defended by the Isthmus of Perekop and the Crimean Mountains in the south, it was in a perfect central position to command the maritime access of all the major rivers draining the steppes to the north.
Given their superior sea power the Greeks were able to retain control of the Crimea and many of these outlying harbours through the whole of antiquity. Even as late as the thirteenth century, nearly two-thousand years later, when the rest of the steppes had been continuously washed by the flood of Asiatic conquerors like the Huns, the Alans, the Pechenegs, the Avars, the Bulgars, the Magyars, the Slavs, and the Mongols, we find that Chersonesus was still a thriving port populated by Greeks and owing allegiance to the Byzantine Empire.
The Byzantines were at last supplanted, but not by Slavs and Tatars from the north as one might have expected. Instead they gave way to Italians from the city of Genoa. Sevastopol became Kalamita. What is now Balaclava was given the very Italian name of Cembalo, and the old Greek Theodosia became Caffa. The Genoese also established trading posts at Azov and Novorossisk.
Genoese rule finally came to an end following the rise of the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth century. The Turks began a vigorous naval construction programme to challenge Italian and Spanish supremacy in the Mediterranean, but what many tend to overlook is the much less dramatic corollary of this effort, their establishment of total maritime supremacy over the Euxine.
The Turks extinguished the Italians and erected fortresses on the ruins of the Greeks who had pinpointed the strategic importance of the areas almost two-thousand years before. Chersonesus became Akyar. Theodosia became Kefe. Eupatoria became Gözleve. And on the mainland the Turks built fortresses to control the Southern Bug at Kinburn near the old Greek city of Olbia, Akkerman to control the Dniester near the ruins of Tyras, Özi on the remains of Borysthenes, and Azak near Tanais and the more recent Genoese settlement of La Tana. Lastly, the Turks constructed a fort on the Tsemes Bay named Soğucak.
From Akyar and its superb natural harbour the Turks were able to remain in constant communication with their base as the Greeks and Genoese had been able to do, and additionally from this harbour they were able to retain control of the mouths of every major river as well as the important Tsemes Bay.
Peter was the first of the Tsars to realise the significance of this fact, essentially that Russia was at the mercy of the Turks. In order to reach the outer world in full force and emerge as a Great Power, the Black Sea must be opened to Russian trade. The Tatars of the steppes fought long wars with the Russians, but time was on the side of the Muscovites who continuously pushed them south until their last stronghold was in the Crimea under the direct protection of the Turks. But here the Russians ran into problems.
Possessing no fleets, and no habours in which to shelter any fleets, the Russians found taking the Turkish forts at the river estuaries to be nigh impossible. With their backs to the sea, the Turks could remain in supply with Anatolia and the Balkans forever. And the Turkish fleet could remain close at hand issuing out from Akyar as required.
The Russians were not oblivious to the fact that the Turkish position was anchored on the Crimea. Unfortunately, initial Russian attempts to directly strike the heart by forcing Perekop and physically occupying the Crimea resulted in lamentable failure.
The primitive Russian communications frequently broke down, leaving crucial provisions in short supply. The distances to their bases were immense, and without control of the sea they were forced to use the narrow neck at Perekop which resulted in many Russians dying from famine and disease, such as during 1687 and 1689 under Prince Vassili Golitsyn, depressing defeats at the same time that Prince Eugene was driving the Turks out of Hungary and Francesco Morosini was capturing the Morea. In 1695 Peter himself laid siege to Azak for several months but was forced to call it off, having achieved nothing.
Peter next sought to rectify this situation by a costly, but successful, assault on the fortress of Azak. This was assisted by an embryonic Russian fleet, a small flotilla in the Don, and in July of 1696 Azak was taken. The Russians built a new fort to the west of the site, naming it Azov. On the newly acquired territory Peter also built Taganrog in 1698. But his defeat and capture on the Pruth in 1711 resulted in his being forced to demolish the fortifications of Azov and Taganrog, burn his fleet, and return his gains to the Porte.
As the Greeks had proven long before, the power on the Black Sea with its communications by water was at a distinct advantage over the power on land to the north. Just as the Greeks could not be dislodged save by the naval power of the Italians, and the Italians could not be dislodged save by the naval power of the Turks, despite all the successes of the Mongols all around the Crimea, so too would the Turks remain until dislodged by the naval power of Russia. And so it became imperative for Russia to build a fleet.
The clock was unfortunately set back for Russia following Peter's defeat in 1711. But his successors made up for lost ground by starting another war in 1735, which Austria joined in 1737. Though the Russians took the more inland Tatar capital of Bakhchisary in 1736, they failed to take any ports and retreated back upon the Ukraine once they ran out of supplies. The Russians captured Azov by storm in June of 1736, and the following year took Özi, by then becoming known as Ochakov. The Russians again forced Perekop and reached major inland cities in 1737, but lack of supplies and Turkish reinforcements by sea again compelled them to retire.
The Austrians were meanwhile defeated in Bosnia and, even more seriously, outside of Belgrade, after which time Belgrade was lost and Austria withdrew from the war in humiliation. Though the Russians had crossed the Dniester to take Khotin and invade Moldavia, the removal of Austria from the war and the impending declaration of war by Sweden seriously undermined Russia's ability to continue fighting. Accordingly, the Russians gave up their more ambitious claims, in the end settling for just Azov and the mouth of the Don, and agreeing that they were not allowed to maintain a fleet on the Black Sea.
But, naturally, this was bound to be only a temporary check. In 1768 the ambitions of Catherine the Great again put Russia at odds with the Turks. But interestingly, this time the Russians managed to bring a fleet into action. Their fleet in the Baltic circumnavigated Europe to reach the Aegean, where it engaged and destroyed the Turkish fleet at Chesma.
The Turks were most foolish for facing the Russians there when they could have retired into the Black Sea, where the Russians could not follow. As it were, now deprived of their most powerful ships, the Turks in the Black Sea were hard put to protect their forts. At the same time, the Russian victory under Admiral Alexei Orlov allowed the Orlov Revolt in Greece and the Balkans to flare up, tying down thousands of Turkish soldiers, raising the spectre of dismemberment of Turkey's European empire, and dramatically displaying the boundless ambition of St. Petersburg in the Balkans for the first time.
However, thanks to the intervention of Austria and the still tenacious resistance of the Turks, the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774 was not as bad as it could have been. The Southern Bug with the fortress of Kinburn, became the new western border of Russia. There Prince Gregori Potemkin built Nikolayev, the largest shipyard in Russia. The Crimea became independent of the Turks, as a sort of buffer, to which was included the mouth of the Don. And finally the line of the River Kuban demarcated the two empires in the northern Caucasus.
But Catherine's ambitions were insatiable. In 1783 with great pomp she annexed the Crimea and designated Sevastopol as the Russian Black Sea fleet's headquarters. As a sort of delayed reaction, the Turks declared war in 1787. In 1788 Prince Potemkin, with the help of the rapidly growing Russian fleet, captured Ochakov. Admiral Fyodor Ushakov then turned his fleet against the Turks at sea, which defeated their fleet at Tendra and the Kerch Strait. This allowed the Russians to cut the supply lines of the Turkish forts and to ferry supplies to their own armies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Russians under Aleksandr Suvorov were able to push as far as the Danube before the Ottomans threw in the towel.
Once again foreign intervention, mostly Prussian and French, together with another invasion by Sweden, compelled the Russians to accept a modest peace. They pushed their frontier to the Dneister and the fortress of Akkerman controlling its mouth, where they were soon to found the city of Odessa. But Russia won the greatest prize of all, the Crimea, for the Sultan recognised its annexation by Russia and could no longer prevent the construction of a Russian fleet.
The decline of the Turks, exacerbated by their numerous enemies fighting them on multiple fronts, had allowed the Russians to gain naval supremacy in the Black Sea. For the first time in history, the power dominating the Black Sea was centred on the north shore instead of on the south shore. This was unnatural as Russia's centre was still comparatively very distant. But Turkey's weakness allowed this to happen.
Because of this the Russians were to fight with increasing success against the Turks in the following century. The latter, deprived of their sea power, could no longer adequately project their power north of the Balkan or Caucasus ranges in Europe and Asia respectively. As a result they could no longer maintain their strategically placed fortresses, allowing the Russians to seize them before crossing the Danube at Galatz.
So in the next war, that of 1806-1812, the Russians crossed the Danube into Bulgaria and made off with Bessarabia, pushing their border to the Pruth. They also achieved a protectorate over Georgia. In the war after that, 1828-1829, the Russians got farther than they ever had before. The Balkan Mountains were successully traversed. Fed by supplies over water to Varna and Burgas, the Russians pushed down the Maritsa to capture Adrianople on the Thracian Plain. Constantinople lay before them, but the Turks panicked, deciding to sue for peace. The discomfort this caused in European capitals convinced the powers to impose a moderating influence on Russia.
Consequently, Russia accepted the annexation of all Turkish territory north of the Caucasus, which Russia began to push to the south of henceforth, already having won wars against Persia pushing the Russian border to the Araxes to the east, and also the creation of an independent Greece and Serbia.
The power of Russia was now greatly increasing. It became clear to the powers that Russian naval supremacy expedited Russian attacks through the Balkans and the Caucasus, allowing them to sustain many more men and to move them much more rapidly than previously, while the Turkish defences were by constrast fatally undermined. Statesmen began fearing that Russia would soon destroy the Ottoman Empire. The Russians themselves unfortunately encouraged this belief by suggesting a partition of Turkey. But Russia's confidence was soon to endure a severe setback.
In 1853 the Russians invaded the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Immediately they were demanded to evacuate by Austria. Where Austria threatened, France and Britain acted. Both declared war on Russia and began the Crimean War.
Many think this war was silly and pointless, nothing could be farther from the truth. The overarching purpose was to destroy the Russian Black Sea fleet, by this action alone could Turkey be saved, which was at length achieved. Not without difficulty, however, for unfortunately the Russians prudently withdrew their fleet into Sevastopol.
While this protected their fleet, it was a dangerous game as there was nowhere else it could go. This meant that the British and French need only bring artillery within range of the harbour, as the Americans were to do at Santiago de Cuba to force Admiral Pascual Cervera out in 1898, to force the Russians into the open.
The Crimean War again demonstrated the superiority of the sea over the land in this quadrant of the globe. The Russians were to be reminded that the only reason they held sway in the Black Sea was on account of Turkish decadence. Faced with the power of France and Britain at sea, they had no hope of victory. And it was soon found out that the British and French could bring troops to the Crimea more quickly by sea than Russia could by land over its dreadful roads. The Russians found themselves not only unable to push their enemies back into the sea, but could not even relieve Sevastopol, which at last fell after a lengthy siege.
Russia's proud sailors scuttled their fleet in the harbour, and Russia's Black Sea presence came to an end for the next several decades. Russia's frontier was pushed back to the Dneister, as Bessarabia was returned to the Turks.
Now one might object that the Crimean War failed to achieve its purpose, for the Russians declared the 1856 Treaty of Paris null and void, deciding to rebuild their fleet following France's defeat at Prussia hands in 1871. I am of a much different opinion.
Though the Russians had declared their intention to rebuild their fleet, by the time war again broke out with Turkey in 1877, they hadn't actually seriously begun to do so. They found themselves with no fleet, and failing this they were unable to turn the position of Chataldzha that was the last ditch protecting Constantinople. Though the Russians were able to set up an impressive system of supply that stretched overland through the Troyan and Shipka Passes, they were greatly delayed at Plevna and permanently halted at Chataldzha.
The sluggish Russian advance compared unfavourably to their achievements in 1828-1829, and this was most probably due to inferior logistics caused by their lack of a fleet. When the Russians arrived before Chataldzha they found themselves unable to muster the strength to assault it head on, and had no fleet with which to bypass it.
Thus the Crimean War arguably saved the Turks one last time. Unable to seize Constantinople, the Russians contented themselves by stripping Turkey of Bulgaria, forcing her to disgorge the valley of the Morava to Serbia, Thessaly to Greece, while taking Kars and Bessarabia (again) for themselves. Though the Turks were much diminished by this, they survived.
As it turned out, 1878 was the last chance Russia had to gain Constantinople and because it did not have its fleet at the critical moment, thanks to its loss in the Crimean War, she missed it. In 1912 the newly created Balkan states united to destroy most of the remaining Turkish European empire, while Germany was drifting into open collision with Russia. Though Russia had superiority on the Black Sea during WWI and WWII, the pressing necessity of resisting the Germans to the west prevented them from effectively taking advantage of it to assault Turkey with troops that were required elsewhere.
With the end of WWII the United States took up the burden of defending the Turks from Russian aggression. This was symbolised with American financial and military aid to Turkey to suppress its communist elements favourable to Russia, recently incited to sedition in both Greece and Turkey by Moscow.
Stalin, realising the strengh of American sea power and therefore of the futility of pressing aggressive intentions upon Constantinople, agreed to a sort of balance in the Black Sea. Turkey would remain a client of the US, but would open the Straits to Russian shipping. Russia would predominate on the Black Sea from Sevastopol, using its fleet as a bargain chip to ensure Turkish compliance and goodwill. And this situation has quietly persisted down to our present day.
Having completed the narrative, it is worthwhile to touch base on what we learn from what it shows. But first off we need to go over what geography tells us about the situation. This section was taken from something I wrote at the beginning of the present dispute to explain Russia's geographic interest in the peninsula.
As you may know, navies are limited by what harbours they can use. Harbours sufficient for civilian use are most often not suitable for military purposes because they lack depth, space, protection, and adequate facilities for storing reserves of fuel, ammunition, and foodstuffs, housing personnel, as well as for repairing vessels which usually requires very large dry-docks as warships are larger and heavier than merchant ships.
Basically what we see is that naval harbours have to be very deep, very spacious, with sheltered harbours having easily controlled and protected entrances, plenty of room on shore for logistical facilities, as well as for facilities to maintain and repair warships, and additionally preferably are remote from major civilian metropolises.
Thus, for example, we see that France's naval bases are limited to two major ports, Brest on the Atlantic, and Toulon on the Mediterranean. Despite France's extensive coasts and myriad of commercial harbours, none of them for various reasons are of any use as fleet bases save the aforementioned two.
This is the first cardinal fact, that not just any port can be a naval base, in fact relatively few of them can be. Another useful example of this point is that despite Italy's extensive coasts, with water on all sides, the only suitable anchorages for a fleet base are La Spezia in Liguria, La Maddalena in Sardinia, and Taranto in Apulia.
Understanding this, we realise that the harbours available as fleet bases in the Black Sea are likewise extremely limited.
This map shows the important commercial harbours for Russian trade as orange circles; Nikolayev, Odessa, and Azov in Ukraine, with Rostov and Novorossisk in Russia. The vast majority of Russian export trade passes through these ports on its way across the Black Sea and thus to the outside world.
Looking towards the southwest of the map, we see the Sea of Marmara. Connecting the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara is the very narrow Bosphorus Strait, highlighted in green. Connecting the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean Sea is the Strait of the Dardenelles. Together the two straits are colloquially known as the Turkish Straits, and are the only way most Russian export trade can get from the Black Sea to its customers across the oceans, as well as importing commodities from foreign sources.
For this reason, anybody controlling Constantinople controls the lifeline of Russia. If the Turks closed the straits Russia would suffocate as she could neither import nor export the vast majority of what she needs.
In order to guarantee themselves against the possibility of Turkey closing the straits for any given reason, Russia maintains a Black Sea fleet. This fleet gives Russia leverage against the Turks, allowing Russia to strike at the extensive northern coast of Anatolia and the ability to strike rapidly at Constantinople itself, called Istanbul on the map, the largest and richest Turkish city and the hub of its economic activity. This is a potent weapon to compel the Turks to keep the straits accessible in times of crisis. Without it, Russia is powerless to keep her airway open.
Now going back to naval bases, where Russia could permanently dock this fleet is extremely limited. The yellow circles identify those within close proximity to Russia. In Georgia are the limitedly useful harbours of Batumi and Poti, which are no longer used for naval purposes. The only truly suitable anchorage for a main fleet base is Sevastopol in the Crimea.
So what we see is that Russia is forced to either hold Sevastopol, or her naval presence on the Black Sea is to be terminated. If the Russian Black Sea Fleet left the Black Sea for the Baltic, Russia would have no means of obtaining assurance that the Turks keep the straits open to Russian trade if major war were to loom.
The Turks have closed the straits to Russia before, and the results have been absolutely devastating. Such as in WWI, the dislocation of the Russian economy and the subsequent discontent of the Russian people which led to two revolutions in one year was largely the result of the stifling of Russian trade by the closure of the straits by the Turks. Additionally, this precluded Russian access to crucial war material needed from her allies in the West, which arguably contributed to Russian shell and artillery shortages, causing her armies to be perpetually inferior to the Central Powers in firepower. Naturally this weakened Russia's ability to successfully contend with her antagonists and contributed to her staggering losses.
Thus the retention of Sevastopol and the removal of any threats to it by the government of the Ukraine, or of anyone else, is imperative to the survival of the Russian state.
One may object that Russia could put pressure on the Turks by a direct land invasion. As can be seen on the map, this would be most difficult from the west, as the Balkans and the Ukraine separate Russia from the straits on the European side. Additionally the comparatively narrow neck of land between the Carpathians and the Black Sea that forms eastern Romania is a death trap that the Austrian Empire traditionally exploited to compel the Russians to evacuate the Balkans, such as in 1829, 1856, and 1878. Especially considering that the marshes of the Danube Delta determine that Galatz is the farthest east one can cross from Moldavia into Wallachia over the line formed by the rivers Tatros-Sareth-Danube, essentially narrowing the Russian lines of communication even further to extend through a corridor formed between Foksány and Galatz, a distance of only about fifty-five miles in width. Though the Austrian Empire is no more, its policies can yet teach those who remain what may be done in similar situations.
This leaves the possibility of Russia striking through Georgia, which is weak and small. While this might seem ideal since Georgia is hardly to be expected to prevent Russian entry, the geography in this area is much less favourable for military operations, especially those of armoured formations which are Russia's primary advantage. The Caucasus Mountain chain, outlined in red, throws itself between Russia and Turkey, with colossal jagged peaks. Once across the main spine, there's still mountainous country for several hundred miles in any direction. This is highly defensible terrain for even weak opponents, and the Turks certainly aren't weak on land, further compounded by the fact that Russia would be unable to deploy her great numerical superiority in armour.
Furthermore, though there's less territory separating Turkey from Russia in this area, there's much more territory separating Russia from the straits, namely the whole length of mountainous hostile Anatolia. This is additionally constricted by the remoteness of the Caucasus from the Russian centre of gravity, which is far to the northwest. Getting troops to the region and maintaining them there would tax Russian logistical capacity, which would be further taxed by having to use narrow mountain passes traversible only by single columns of trucks, rather than by multiple trains. The amount of forces the Russians could deploy there would therefore necessarily be only be a fraction of their total strength, and, even if successful, would still be so far from the Turkish Straits as to hardly be able to compel the Turks to reopen them.
And so Russia's only real hope lies with the Black Sea fleet. This is much stronger than the Turkish fleet, and allows Russia a direct and decisive means of driving a stake into the very heart of Turkish power with great rapidity, which the Turks could not effectively prevent. It is the only thing standing between Russia and her potential suffocation. For this reason Russia absolutely cannot allow anything to happen to Sevastopol, and this fact serves to explain Russia's recent activity over the past few months in relation to the Ukraine in general and the Crimea in particular.
Understanding these salient points is only part of the lesson we draw from history and geography, however. For the above presupposes that Turkey, or any power using Turkey to access the Turkish Straits, remains passive. This would be making a dangerous assumption. For if the opponent were to be more active than suggested above, they could easily inflict even greater damage upon Russia, which shall be described below.
The historical narrative supplements the lessons of geography with yet further illumination. These lessons are primarily that the power controlling the sea is superior to that stronger on land. A relatively small force backed by a strong naval presence could destroy the Russian Black Sea fleet and seize control the Crimea by virtue of its more facile access by maritime communication and narrow connexion to the mainland.
This would be disastrous for Russia. The reason for this would be, of course, that the enemy could then base their fleet in Sevastopol. All of the ports in the north apart from Sevastopol are of limited utility for a major fleet. But assuming that Russia attempts to use them anyway, the problem is that any fleet leaving the Sea of Azov or the estuary of the Dnieper and Southern Bug must pass either east or west of Sevastopol, which can therefore intercept fleets moving either direction. This is equally true of any commercial shipping, which would have no choice but to hazardously sail close to the Crimea.
What this means is that a vigorous naval power, as the Greeks, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Genoese, and Turks were at one time or another, could effectively prevent any establishment of sea power, commerical or naval, on the northern shore of the Black Sea. Not only could they thus prevent the Russians from sending their trade through the Black Sea, they could prevent the Russians from even developing any means of protecting this trade. Like the Greeks, Genoese, and the Turks in their prime, the hypothetical naval power could use the Crimea as a base to control the mouths of every major river either directly or indirectly. This would essentially gather all the threads of the major Russian, Belarussian, and Ukrainian trade routes in the hands of the naval power controlling the Crimea.
What history and geography also tell us is that this situation would be exceedingly difficult to reverse for a land-based power on the northern shore. Using the extremely defensible chokepoint of Perekop, and the power of its fleet, the naval hegemon can prevent an enemy army from bursting through into the Crimea, and even if that were to happen, the defensible position of Sevastopol, surrounded as it is by rugged mountainous terrain, wwould tend to again make its capture a difficult enterprise. Additionally, if the enemy were to breach Perekop, he would risk leaving his army trapped in the Crimea if a force were to land behind him and retake the isthmus.
Yet, so long as the Crimea remained in enemy possession and harbouring an enemy fleet, it could dominate the trade of the northern rivers which must necessarily collect in, and issue from, harbours close by and easily dominated by a fleet stationed at Sevastopol. The ancient city of Tauric Chersonesus grew rich by controlling the trade of the Don, the Southern Bug, the Kuban, the Dnieper, and the Dniester, which it then transported to Constantinople. This in antiquity was one of the major routes for the introduction of Chinese goods into Europe. This northern trade coupled with the direct route through Persia, also controlled by Constantinople, and the route through the Red Sea ports of Egypt, controlled by the Ottomans or Byzantines, allowed Constantinople to gather most of the eastern trade in its own hands. This made the power on the Bosphorus enormously wealthy, but at the expence of the impoverished Slavs and Tatars on the northern shore.
The Russians with admirable determination and implacable will have redressed this handicap in their favour, alone of the inhabitants of the steppe for the whole of recorded history. But it must be borne in mind that the only reason they were able to achieve this at all was because of the shameful decay of Turkish naval power. The fact remains that Russia's relative strategic position is much less advantageous than a potential naval power across the Black Sea. If the Crimea were lost, Russia would forfeit not only her sole guarantee for Turkish friendship, but would also forfeit any ability of ever regaining a position of dominance again. For what other port could she use? And even if by herculean efforts she did manage to dredge one to sufficient depth and width, how could she solve the problem of it being controlled by the central position of Sevastopol?
It is most important to recall that Russia was not a major European power until Kutchuk Kainardji, which is seen as a decisive turning point for so many different important reasons. But for our purposes, the one most relevant was the establishment of a Russian Black Sea fleet at long last. This dramatically reversed the course of the Russo-Turkish Wars during the nineteenth century. Whereas before they were small scale affairs with limited Russian success on the bleak northern shore, once they were equipped with a fleet the Russians threatened to storm Constantinople itself and tear down the minarets of the Sultan to their very foundations. For that reason many historians choose to open the classic diplomatic conundrum of the "Eastern Question" with Kutchuk Kainardji, which serves as a useful watershed on so many levels.
Faced with this alarming development, the Turks could no longer be so cavalier in their treatment of the Russians. As the nineteenth century progressed, Russian trade through the Black Sea swelled year after year. Grain shipments doubled, and redoubled. Population exploded. From 1800 to 1900 Russia soared into first place in Europe in size of population, its GDP surpassed that of France, and if Professor Norman Stone's figures are correct, overtook Britain's too before the outbreak of the First World War.
Turkish unilateral attempts to forestall this resulted in heavy defeats that came dangerously close to definitively ending the existence of the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France formed a temporary restraint, but Russia's growth was at last arrested, and at length reversed, by the efforts of Germany in conjunction with Turkey. Russia's future hopes of economic and political recovery are in large measure dependent upon retaining her dominant Black Sea position. She is at a vulnerable low at this point in time. The Soviet Union was able to threaten Constantinople by land through the client states of Bulgaria and Romania, augmenting the already terrifying sword of Damocles that was the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.
But times have since changed. Bulgaria, Romania, and even the Ukraine now impede any Russian advance overland, while Russia's Black Sea fleet is aging. It cannot seriously hope to fend off a determined modern navy. If such a navy were permitted into the Black Sea, repercussions for allowing which Turkey now has little to fear, the Crimea could plausibly be seized using its unique position in relation to the sea. That would leave Russia's ultimate destruction ensured.
So I end this treatise by stating that Russia's current Black Sea supremacy is singular in history, that it was largely accidental on account of Turkish weakness, and is in potential danger of being undone. A reversion to the more natural state is entirely possible. With the Ukraine adamantly resisting Russia, access through that country to reach the Isthmus of Perekop is doubtful at best, impossible at worst. This leaves Russia's communications with the Crimea very perilously dependent upon sea communications between Kerch and the Caucasus. While these are not serious in peacetime, given proximity, they may easily become exposed in wartime. If a fleet were to seize Kerch and operate even light naval units out of the harbour, communication with Russia would be irrevocably severed.
Without trying to sound too dramatic or prophetic, we may well be witnessing the beginning of the end for Russia. In many respects the rise of the Russian Empire, a power based on the northern shore of the Black Sea, was contrary to the nature of economics and power politics determined by geography. The dilapidation of Turkey made it possible, and for two glorious centuries Russia has catapulted herself to the forefront of European nations. But it would appear that the sands of time are running out. It remains to be seen just how precarious the foundations of Russian power truly are.
- Kaiser