The Spanish-American War is particularly useful in the illustration of the principles of sea power.
Naturally, as we all know, Spain was defeated and lost the majority of what remained to her of her once vast empire, retaining only Rio de Oro, Spanish Guinea (with the island of Fernando Pó), and later acquiring Northern Morocco.
But what was lost was far more substantial; the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, together with the smaller islands attached to them, and in the Pacific the Philippines and Guam, were ceded to the United States. In addition, Spain later sold the Caroline and Mariana Islands, together with Palau, to Germany.
Despite later perceptions, this was not a result of Spanish fragility. Spain was actually rather well matched against its adversary. The opposing fleets shall be described below.
With the terminal loss of the USS Maine, the United States Navy was divided between three centres.
The Pacific Squadron formed around the USS Oregon, a pre-dreadnought battleship armed with four 13-inch guns and eight 8-inch guns, based in San Diego, California.
For immediate available use were the two squadrons formed from the remaining ships in the Atlantic.
The first was the North Atlantic Fleet under Admiral William Thomas Sampson, composed of the battleships Iowa, with four 13-inch guns and eight 8-inch guns, Indiana with four 12-inch and eight 8-inch guns, the heavy cruiser New York with eight 8-inch guns, and the very light cruisers Vixen and Gloucester with only four 2.2-inch guns. This fleet was based at Key West in the islands off the southwest tip of Florida. To it was designated the task of declaring and enforcing the blockade of Havana, the capital of Spanish Cuba.
The second of these was the Flying Squadron under Admiral Winfield Scott Schley. This was made up of the battleships Massachusetts, with four 12-inch guns and eight 8-inch guns, and Texas with two 12-inch and six 6-inch guns, with the heavy cruiser Brooklyn with eight 8-inch guns, and the light cruisers Columbia and Minneapolis with one 8-inch and two 6-inch guns. These were based on Norfolk, Virginia, taking what was believed to have been an ideal central position to rush out to defend the American Atlatnic coast either north or south should the Spanish appear.
Given the weakness of American shore defences and almost total lack of coastal artillery, the country was very fearful of the Spanish possibly striking the coasts of the eastern seaboard, and until the location and intentions of the Spanish fleet were known, it was decided to keep Schley in the Hampton Roads at Norfolk, Virginia, over nine-hundred miles from Key West, and even farther when one considers that Sampson would most often be another one-hundred miles to the southward off Havana.
Thus the two detachments of the American fleet, roughly equal, where divided and placed too far away from one another to have been within rapid supporting distance. This was a grave strategic mistake in violation of the concentration of force maxim, which may have cost the US much if Spain had taken advantage of it.
Spain was unable to do so because the Spanish Ministry of Marine made a very foolish division of its own fleet into two separate bodies.
The first of these was the Caribbean Squadron under Admiral Pascual Cervera. This was comprised of the heavy cruisers Cristóbal Colón, with one 11-inch and two 8-inch guns,Vizcaya, Infanta Maria Teresa, and Almirante Oquendo, all armed with two 11-inch guns and ten 5.5-inch guns, and the destroyers Plutón, Terror, and Furor, armed with two 6-inch guns and several torpedoes. These, upon the outbreak of war, were coaling in the port of Mindelo on the Portuguese island of São Vicente, in the Cape Verde Islands off the west coast of Africa.
Spain's other squadron was named the Second Squadron, under Admiral Manuel Cámara. This was made up of the battleship Pelayo, with two 12.6-inch and two 11-inch guns, the heavy cruiser Emperador Carlos V with two 11-inch and eight 5.5-inch guns, the very light cruisers Rapido and Patriota, armed with 2.2-inch guns, and the destroyers Audaz, Osada, and Prosepina, armed with two 6-inch guns and torpedoes, with the transports Buenos Aires, Panay, Alfonso XII, and Antonio Lopez. This squadron was based on the port of Cádiz on the southwest coast of Spain itself.
From this one can see that the Spanish ships were outgunned by the American battleships. But not overwhelmingly. Especially given the division of the American fleet. If Cámara and Cervera were united they'd oppose two American battleships and one heavy cruiser with one battleship of their own, and five heavy cruisers together with six destroyers.
Now it is often said that a ship that has not the range of its enemy is bound to fail. This is often true, insofar as the ship also lacks the requisite speed to bring her own inferior armament within range. The Spanish ships were all faster than the American ships, especially as the American squadrons could only move as fast as their slowest member, the battleships. The Americans would have to decide between chasing five heavy cruisers with one of their own, which was outgunned by every single Spanish cruiser, or else slowing their cruisers to the same speed
as the battleships, in order to rely on their support.
In the former case such a choice could result in the destruction of the cruiser in isolation. In the latter case that would allow the Spanish to run if they did not wish for a fight. Or it would allow the Spanish to strike and retire at their leisure, as they could not be caught.
The second problem was that so long as the Spanish fleet's destination and intentions were unknown, the possibility of them striking the coast of the US remained on the table, however remote, and public clamour caused the government to feel that it was necessary to keep Schley in Norfolk.
Spain's problems, by comparison were of a somewhat different nature. Since Cuba would fall unless relieved, deficient as it was of foodstuffs, Spain needed to break the American blockade. The best way to do this was to destroy the two separated American squadrons with their own squadrons united.
Unfortunately, once war was declared, Cervera had to quit the Cape Verde Islands given Portugal's neutrality. He ought to have been able to sail northwards to form a junction with Cámara coming from the opposite direction at Las Palmas de Gran Canaria in the Spanish-controlled Canary Islands.
But since Cámara's squadron was not yet done refitting, and the Spanish government felt that withdrawing Cervera's squadron to the north would look like a confession of weakness, it instead ordered Cervera alone to sail directly for the Caribbean, despite his objections.
This was a strategically foolish decision. It precluded any possibility of Cámara and Cervera uniting in the future, and opposed only four heavy cruisers against two battleships and one heavy cruiser. The Americans of either squadron were equal to Cervera, who would thus risk his own destruction even by engaging them divided.
Nonetheless Cervera had the element of surprise and was still much faster than his opponents. When he raised anchor from Mindelo, the US Department of the Navy knew not where he was headed.
So long as Cervera remained at large his fleet embodied the "fleet-in-being" concept. The idea of the fleet-in-being was first defined by English Admiral Lord Torrington in his contest with the French Admiral the Comte de Tourville in the English Channel in the year 1690 during the Nine Years' War. He defined it thus;
"Had I fought otherwise, our fleet had been totally lost, and the kingdom lain open to invasion. As it was, most men were in fear that the French would invade; but I was always of another opinion, for I always said that whilst we had a fleet in being, they would not dare to make an attempt."
Essentially this means that the fleet-in-being, simply by existing, threatens the sea communications of an enemy and can potentially cut them so long as it stays afloat. So that the fleet must be neutralised or destroyed before any undertaking dependent upon maritime communications can be envisioned. Which meant, for our example, that the US could land no troops on Cuba or Puerto Rico until Cervera showed his hand.
Which was not long in coming. On 29 April, 1898, Cervera's squadron weighed anchor from Mindelo. Looking at the map, Puerto Rico lay between Spain and Cuba, and on that island lay the defended anchorage of San Juan.
There Cervera could find coal and provisions. This would give him a secure base far from Key West, and allow him to intercept Schley should he attempt to sail south. Additionally he would still be outside the American fleet's wider area of operation, and could thus wait there for Cámara, or if need be, to withdraw to the east to fall back on Cámara.
The United States with only two squadrons had hoped to blockade not only Havana, but also Cienfuegos, Santiago de Cuba, and San Juan. But they found this beyond their strength. Sampson duly imposed the blockade on Havana, but since Cienfuegos was on the south coast of the island, the opposite from Havana, he was unable to effectively blockade it. Given his resources, he was also unable to blockade Santiago or San Juan at all.
So if Cervera arrived in San Juan he'd be in a favourable position to play havoc with Sampson's blockade, which did not escape the calculations of his enemies.
Sampson, apparently believing himself capable of gleaning his enemy's intention on account of this observance, sailed east for Puerto Rico. On 7 May he reached Cape Haïtien, on the northern coast of Haiti.
Receiving no news of the Spaniards, he decided to continue with his plans and push east for Puerto Rico hoping to either find the Spanish within the harbour or to catch them when they arrived. Accordingly, on the morning of 12 May, Sampson arrived off San Juan and began shelling the forts protecting its entrance.
But it would appear that his thoughts were uneasy. On 9 May he received a report that Cervera had been off Guadaloupe, and another that he had actually put in at St. Thomas. Guadaloupe was a possession of France, and St. Thomas was at this time still a possession of Denmark, which would later be sold to the US in 1917.
Neither of the reports were true, but their basic strategic reality was. Cervera had in fact decided to give Sampson the slip. On 10 May, Cervera had arrived off the French island of Martinique, curiously enough a little to the south and a day later than had where he had been reported in the false alarm. Cervera had sent the destroyer Terror ahead to the island to secretly rendezvous with French authorities friendly to Spain, who informed him that Sampson had been seen going east from Cape Haïtien.
Evidently concluding from this that Sampson was heading for Puerto Rico, Cervera decided on a bold gamble. He would race west, to coal at the Dutch island of Curaçao, north of Venezuela, and from there race to Cuba.
Because of Cervera's careful precautions, keeping his squadron far out to sea and avoiding sending his ships into any commercial harbour, the Americans were not yet aware that he was in the Caribbean.
But by chance the false report seems to have convinced Sampson that the game was afoot, because he suddenly, for whatever reason, decided that the Spanish were not heading for San Juan. He told the Secretary of the Navy that though he could hold take San Juan and surprise the Spanish should they arrive, or at least deny the base to them, he decided it was false policy.
A sudden glimmer of strategic insight appears to have come to him, perhaps inspired by the false intelligence, into concluding that Cervera would use neutrals to give him the slip. He accordingly justified his decision to steam back towards Havana on the 13th with;
"The fact that we should be held several days in completing arrangements for holding the place; that part (of the squadron) would have to be left to await thearrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the Flying Squadron was still to the north and not in a position to render any aid; that Havana, Cervera's natural objective, was thus open to entry by such a force as his, while we were a thousand miles distant - made our immediate movement toward Havana imperative."
This resolute singleness of purpose was an excellent adoption of strategic principle. Sampson had been tempted by San Juan, both as the possible destination of his enemy and by his own ability to take it by force. But had he done so he would have wasted several days on a tertiary objective while his enemy, with clear-sighted purpose, fixed his gaze and his actions upon the primary objective.
If Cervera had arrived off Havana while Sampson was at San Juan, he could have destroyed all the American light craft maintaining the blockade, which would make its reimposition exceptionally difficult. Once these blockading ships were scattered Cervera could disappear again into the waves, his next location unknown to Sampson.
Or, alternatively, Cervera could seek refuge within Havana, the hub of the colonial authorities in Cuba, and an extremely well-fortified harbour surrounded by Spanish troops and sympathisers. Once there it would be exceedingly difficult for the Americans to get him out again, allowing him to fully take advantage of the fleet-in-being strategy.
To prevent Cervera from dispersing the blockade or entering Havana, that officer's primary strategic objective, thus was perceived by Sampson to be the first priority of his own command. Since the US decided it could take Cuba by blockade, it became Spain's primary purpose to break that blockade. This made Cervera's ultimate objective known, the ships outside Havana.
Puerto Rico, however valuable to Spain, was less important for its objectives than breaking the American blockade. Cervera therefore had early on decided to bypass San Juan in his strategically sound resolve to achieve his primary objective.
Cervera must have been very elated and hopeful upon hearing news that Sampson had gone to Puerto Rico, succumbing to the temptation of that prize. For if Sampson remained there fooling around with lesser objectives Cervera would be free to fall like a thunderbolt out of the sky to shatter the American blockade and relieve Cuba.
But Sampson, led astray though he was, obviously recognised his error quickly enough. He could speculate as where Cervera was now, or was going to be along his route, all he wished without being any closer to the truth. It could be Guadaloupe. It could be Haiti. It could be Puerto Rico. It could be the Dominican Republic. It could be St. Thomas, or St. Martin's, or Trinidad, or any other island.
Whichever one it was would not have mattered, as Sampson at length appears to have realised. Wherever Cervera was now, or was going to stop to recoal, could never be definitely known by him. But where Cervera must end up undoubtedly was known to him. Havana. Instead of trying to guess which path Cervera might take to get there by fumbling blindly in the dark, Sampson decided to instead wait for his adversary at the finish line, where, in the end, he must go.
At this point shall be discussed the fate of the American battleship in the Pacific.
It became a worry to the US Navy as to the whereabouts of their battleship, the USS Oregon. It had left San Diego on 29 March. Since the Panama Canal was not yet constructed, this war being a powerful incentive for that project, beginning only in 1904, in order to reach the Atlantic the Oregon had to go the long way around and pass through the Straits of Magellan.
Having rather clumsily failed to set a predetermined route for their battleship, the Navy Department had no idea which route it had actually taken or where it was. This was again a near miss for the United States. For at about 3:30 AM on 18 May, she steamed into the port of Bridgetown on the British-controlled island of Barbados. Here she refilled her coal bunkers and set out for the Jupiter Inlet on the southeast coast of Florida.
This was dangerous because not six days before Cervera had sailed past Martinique, unbeknownst to the Americans, and the arrival of the Oregon in Bridgetown was reported by the newspapers, by which means Cervera learned of its presence. Cervera was now much closer to the Oregon than was the Oregon to either its destination or its nearest support.
In the event Cervera, for whatever reason, decided not to act on this information, and the single American battleships was allowed to slip through his fingers.
While the Americans were worried about the the locations of the Spaniards and the Oregon, the Navy Department seems to have been struck with the same lucidity as Sampson. This may be for the same ostensible reasons as their admiral. Though Cervera was not actually in St. Thomas or Guadaloupe, the rumour that he was may have convinced them that the danger to the American seaboard, always very negligible anyway, was no more, for on 15 May Schley was ordered to Key West to join with Sampson.
In truth this ought to have been done from the beginning. The unfortunate report of Cervera at St. Thomas, despite being false, seems to have doomed the wily Spanish admiral anyway. The Americans were at last waking up to their strategic incompetence, and were at last concentrating their fleets before the primary objective.
Cervera entered into the superb harbour of Willemstad, on the Dutch-controlled island of Curaçao, on the 13th. On the evening of 14 May he had finished coaling and had left. At midnight of the following day Sampson learned that Cervera had been to Curaçao, inevitably reported by the newspapers there, but did not know where he was headed.
Sampson thus decided to despatch the requisitioned merchant ships Harvard and Yale to patrol the Windward Passage between Cuba and Hispaniola, in case Cervera should make for Puerto Rico, still apparently having that island on his mind. Meanwhile the Navy Department had ordered Admiral George Remey, commanding the light units of the blockading fleet, to withdraw from Cienfuegos and, if necessary, to withdraw from Havana too.
On 18 May, the same day the Oregon entered Bridgetown, Schley reached Key West. During the afternoon of the same day, Sampson arrived at Key West in the New York to confer with Schley. It was decided that Schley would go south with the Flying Squadron to blockade Cienfuegos and block the Yucatán Channel, should Cervera seek to reach Havana from the west, which the two admirals considered probable.
At 9 AM on 19 May, the Flying Squadron set sail for Cienfuegos. Later that day, Samspon's battleships, the Iowa and Indiana, arrived at Key West. Sampson, assuming that Cervera would strike Cienfuegos, despatched the Iowa to join Schley outside that harbour.
He himself then took the remainder of his squadron, the Indiana and the New York, to join the blockade off of Havana. On the 21st Sampson arrived outside Havana, while at around midnight of the same day Schley arrived off Cienfuegos.
The Americans were now in a powerful central position. If Cervera arrived outside Havana from the east, he would run into Sampson, who could fall back westwards upon Schley. On the other hand, if Cervera arrived outside Cienfuegos, Schley could likewise fall back to the northeast upon Sampson. Within such close supporting distance the Spanish would find it difficult to pin down and destroy either squadron in detail.
But for almost a week Sampson, off the northwest coast of Cuba, blockading Havana, was dangerously exposed. Having sent the Iowa to join Schley, he had only the New York and the Indiana to face the squadron of Cervera. If Cervera had struck Sampson, the New Yorkmay have escaped to fall back upon Schley, but the much slower Indiana could have been overtaken by Cervera's cruisers and destroyed while it was alone.
It was therefore no doubt a tense week for Sampson. Fortunately for him, on 24 May theOregon steamed into Jupiter Inlet and was told to sail at once for Key West. After reaching Key West she went south to join Sampson off Havana by the 28th. With the Oregon, Sampson replaced the Iowa and the US fleet was deployed in a prime position, either detachment being able to resist Cervera until the other could arrive to render assistance.
Meanwhile the Spanish had been curiously inactive. Having left Willemstad on the 14th, Cervera had steamed northwest to reach Santiago on the 19th. But here he stayed. He might have arrived at Cienfuegos before Schley, though if he did he could have been locked in there.
More dangerously, he might have sailed through the Windward Passage and make straight for Havana along the north coast of Cuba. If he had appeared outside Havana he might have destroyed at least the Indiana, if not the New York too. And would have additionally placed himself between Schley and his base of Key West, and between Schley and theOregon. essentially seizing the interior lines from his opponent. This does much to cast a negative light on the American dispositions until corrected on the 28th.
Yet, unaware of his enemy's faulty movements, Cervera decided to play it safe. The anchorage of Santiago was well protected with shore batteries, and Cervera thus decided to seek refuge within it. As it is obvious that the best way to implement the fleet-in-being strategy is to be shielded within a defended harbour, Cervera appears to have done just that. So long as his ships existed, the American squadrons would have to remain concentrated against him.
It is difficult to guess exactly what Cervera had intended. By allowing himself to be shut up in Santiago, he could not break the blockade before Havana, and it also made it difficult for him to reach the much safer ports of Havana or Cienfuegos. It was now also unlikely that Cámara would ever join him.
But Cámara may yet cause trouble elsewhere. In fact the Spanish government seems to have realised Cervera's change of strategy, effectively pinning the American fleet in place, for on 15 June they ordered Cámara's squadron to sail for the Philippines to destroy Admiral George Dewey, who had defeated Spanish Admiral Patricio Montojo on 1 May, and regain Manila.
This could have been a potentially serious problem. Dewey's Asiatic Squadron consisted of four heavy cruisers, the Olympia, the Raleigh, the Boston, and the Baltimore, together with a couple gunboats. None of these vessels had guns over eight inches in calibre, which would have been seriously outranged by the guns on the Emperador Carlos V and the Pelayo. The Asiatic Squadron would likely have been destroyed and the Philippines regained by the Spanish.
But events in the Caribbean were to prove decisive. Schley left Cienfuegos to reach Santiago on 26 May. Unsure of whether Cervera was really there, on the 30th he decided to return to Key West to coal. On the 29th Sampson set out for Santiago, as the Navy Department was convinced Cervera was there, leaving the Indiana behind to watch Havana.
Fortunately for the US, Schley decided to stay in front of Santiago, which allowed Sampson to join him on 1 June. If Schley had left before Sampson had arrived, the latter would have been open to possible defeat in detail, especially since Schley had arrived from Cienfuegos, that is, from the south coast, while Sampson had arrived from Havana, the north coast, which would place Cervera between them had he come out and had Schley
fallen back to Cienfuegos.
Once outside Santiago, Sampson took overall command, where he found that Cervera was indeed lying within the harbour with his entire squadron. He therefore imposed a rigorous blockade, maintaining his ships by coaling in relays. However, Cervera's superior speed over most of the American ships could still allow him to potentially escape, for only the New York and Brooklyn were fast enough catch him if he broke through.
Additionally, Cervera could remain in Santiago indefinitely, fixing the American fleet in place eternally. This was because the Americans could not hope to enter the harbour, a very protected one accessed only by a narrow and easily defended channel which would have been suicide to try to force.
And so a new problem arose to confront the US Navy that had been briefly touched upon earlier in the narrative. The American fleet could not safely divide itself to both blockade and neutralise Cervera, and simultaneously sail west to the Philippines to counter the threat of Cámara.
Given the fact that it's over five-thousand miles from Santiago to Port Stanley in the Falklands, and another nearly ten-thousand miles from Port Stanley to Manila, which would have been the distance necessary to cover since there was no Panama Canal yet; as opposed to roughly nine-thousand two-hundred miles from Cádiz to Manila, it is unlikely that the Americans would arrive before Cámara even if they were released from having to watch Cervera.
From this observation it seems to the author that the projected expedition of Cámara to the Philippines was an attempt to force the US fleet into excentric movements, compelling them to despatch a number of their warships to the Pacific, which could allow Cervera to escape, and perhaps to score a victory over the divided enemy force.
Naturally, therefore, it became imperative for the US to avoid this bait. The best way to negate Cámara's threat was by the destruction of Cervera before Cámara could reach the Far East.
But how? Cervera could not be destroyed in his anchorage, thus he must be forced out. This conclusion allows us to see another principle of naval war, a fleet-in-being can be countered by forcing it from its base by pressuring it from the landward side.
Meaning, in other words, that the US now had to land troops in Cuba to seize Santiago, so to allow it to turn shore-based artillery against Cervera's ships. If this were to happen, Santiago would transform from an impenetrable sanctuary into a deathtrap. Cervera would be faced between being surely sunk, eventually, in the roadstead, or taking his chances against the squadron upon the waves. Naturally he'd have no choice but the gamble on the latter as his only chance.
So this phase of the contest became a race against time. Cervera must be flushed out of his nest and eliminated as soon as possible. Once that was done, Cámara's actions became superfluous. Even if he were to defeat Dewey, the entire US fleet would be free to regain the Philippines, or even to strike the unprotected coasts of Spain, the latter possibility tending towards retaining Cámara in the Atlantic as the peninsula's only shield.
This made Havana doubly important for Spain. We already noted how breaking the American blockade was the only way Cervera could save Cuba. Having elected instead to remain in Santiago, he could not now prevent American troops from disembarking on Cuban shores, whose intention was to drive Cervera out to open sea where he could be destroyed, the latter still the overarching objective of Sampson.
Sampson had this objective because everything depended upon it. If Cervera were destroyed the Americans need not fear his escape to prey on their transports or cruisers enforcing the blockade. If he were destroyed troops would be free to land in Cuba and Puerto in force, which would result in their fall as they could not be relieved; while at the same time Cevera's destruction would free the American fleet for use in the Pacific against Cámara. Thus merely imprisoning Cervera was not good enough. He was neutralised for the moment, but Sampson needed him terminated.
Santiago is a magnificent and well-protected anchorage. But Cervera was dangerously vulnerable there. During the course of the Cuban Revolution, General Arsenio Martínez Campos established a fortified line along the railway at the narrowest section of the island, connecting the port of Júcaro on the south coast with that of Morón on north coast, with Ciego de Avila connecting them in the centre.
This served to separate the island in half. In the richer more densely populated western part of the island, the Spanish troops were supreme. They held Cienfuegos, Havana, and Matanzas, as well as most of the smaller cities. The Spanish soldiery was numerous and powerful there, and pro-Spanish elements were concentrated in that part of the island.
But in the east it was a different story. The eastern part of the island was more rugged, with the mountains of the Sierra Maestra and thick jungles forming much of the topography. Here movement was difficult as roads were few and in bad shape, while railways were almost non-existent. Movement was further arduous on account of the dominating presence of the rebels beyond the walls of the garrisoned major cities.
Campos, and later General Valeriano Weyler, perfected the limes by which these rebels were isolated in the east and prevented from harming Spanish control over the population and economic centres in the west. While this served to secure Havana, it virtually abdicated Spanish control over the eastern regions of the island.
Communications between garrisons, and between the Spanish military nexus in Havana, were dependent upon tenuous tracks through hostile wild countryside, especially now that communication by sea was prevented on account of the US fleet.
For these reasons it was much better for Cervera to be in Cienfuegos or Havana than in Santiago, for there he could depend on the powerful presence of the Spanish Army to protect him from the landward side. It would only be after a long and determined campaign that the Americans could push him out. But Santiago was remote from the centre of the Spanish base at Havana, and the untamed landscape of the Sierra Maestra that surrounded it was awash with insurgents. It was fatally exposed.
Contact was made with the rebels by the Americans, and on 6 June the US Marines went ashore at Guantánamo, about forty miles east of Santiago, to secure that splendid harbour as a base of operations. The Spaniards were thin on the ground, but offered stubborn resistance until compelled to retire on 10 June, mostly on account of the intense naval fire from Sampson's battleships, which also subsequently silenced Fort Toro.
Having secured this base, which the Americans still possess even today, General William Shafter was landed with around twenty-thousand troops on the beaches of Siboney and Daiquirí, about eight and fourteen miles from Santiago respectively, between 22 and 25 June. The clock was ticking for Cervera.
It seems meanwhile that the Spanish government was unsure of what to do with Cámara's squadron, possibly on account of ignorance as to what Cervera intended to do. Whether this contributed to the delay or not, Cámara only sailed from Cádiz on 15 June, heading east for the Philippines. On 2 July, his squardon passed through the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea.
Back in Washington the Navy Department panicked at Cámara's sudden dash to the east. It decided to strip Sampson of two battleships and send them to the Philippines by way of Suez under Admiral John Watson.
This would have been a very silly mistake. Since Cámara had such an enormous lead over Watson, whose battleships were anyway much slower than the Spanish admiral's, he would undoubtedly arrive in Manila first. There he would find and destroy Dewey, and then could await Watson who also may have been destroyed, especially since his two battleships would be unable to escape an action with Cámara's much faster ships.
At the same time, while these battleships were thus stripped from Sampson for no justifiable reason, this would seriously weaken Sampson's blockade before Santiago. Remember that he had only been able to maintain it continuously by use of relays, so one or two of his command were always absent at a given moment to coal. If Watson was given two battleships permanently on top of that, Cervera's escape would have been virtually guaranteed.
Therefore Cámara's threat nearly achieved what it likely had been intended to achieve. Namely, the very foolish division of the American fleet which would allow the Spaniards a chance to even the odds.
Much to his credit, Sampson now apparently had burned into his mind the desire and intention to destroy Cervera with all haste. He made numerous excuses to delay sending the ships eastwards, demanding that, since his blockade would be reduced, that his remaining ships should be filled as much as possible with coal. He also successfully persuaded the Navy Department to delay sending the ships until Watson arrived from his position before Havana.
Sampson's determination to retain his ships in hand before Santiago probably won the war for the United States, for, in the event of his immediate compliance, he may well have cost his country her fleet.
Returning to the island of Cuba, it is recalled that the American soldiers sent ashore east of Santiago had a job to do. As soon as they had landed on 22 June, the commander of the Santiago garrison, General Ascario Linares, ordered that Colonel Federico Escario bring the nearly four-thousand strong Mazanillo garrison in the west to reinforce him. These promptly left Mazanillo later the same day.
Destiny hinged on the fate of Escario's march, an extraordinary achievement under the cirumstances. As such, it is worth a detailed examination.
From Mazanillo, Escario marched southeast, reaching Palmas Altas by nightfall of the 22nd. On the morning of the 23rd her marched east to Yara. Crossing from the left to the right back of the River Yara, Escario darted across country skirmishing with rebels that sought to impede him, before reaching the River Canabacoa at night on the 24th.
Moving northeast he arrived in Barranca on the 25th. He was skirting north of the Sierra Maestra, that stronghold of rebel activity, along the main road to Santiago, so he discovered that his next crossing, of the River Bayamo, through the town of the same name, was controlled by Cuban guerrillas.
Accordingly he was tied up for the whole of the 26th in fighting the insurgents for control of Bayamo, which he at length succeeded in capturing. He rested in Bayamo for the night, and set out east again on the morning of the 27th. Passing through Santa Rita and Jiguani, he found the road to the southeast at Baire barred by yet another group of guerrillas.
On the night of the 28th he arrived before Baire, and spent the whole of the 29th combatting the rebels and resting his men once the place was gained. On the 30th he set out again leaving Baire. At Doncella east of city and river of Contromaestre, the column again fell in with the rebels and fought an action throughout the day.
The following day, 1 July, was spent driving the rebels from the hills around Aguacate. After resting that night and marching throughout the following day, the Escario's men finally reached Palma Soriano on the night of the 2nd. Marching at a steady pace in the brilliant sunlight and savage heat of Cuban summer on the early morning of 3 July, Escario's men heard the guns of the two navies blasting furiously to the south, and listened to the shelling of Santiago by Shafter's artillery to the east. They were too late.
For the Americans had wasted no time in preparing their assault on Santiago. The Spanish were well entrenched at El Caney and on San Juan Hill to the east of Santiago. Shafter sent his troops to secure these two positions so that his artillery could then fire on the Spanish defences within the city. On 1 July were fought the famous Battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill.
With their modern German-made Mausers, the Spanish inflicted disproportionately heavy losses on the Americans. But after a desperate day's engagement, Linares ordered the Spanish to retreat within the city. Shafter brought up his siege guns and formally began the siege of Santiago on 3 July, just as Escario was arriving to reinforce Linares from Palma Soriano.
Given the spirited resistance of the Spanish at San Juan and El Caney, many have conjectured that Escario's arrival a few days earlier may have turned the tide and kept the Americans at bay. Historians also point out that Shafter's army was the only one the US had, and had it failed, especially if it had failed after being bloodily repulsed, then there could be no question of taking Santiago that year.
This would have raised numerous problems for the Americans. Obviously it would allow Cámara the time to reach Manila and destroy Dewey. It would also have, in all probability, resulted in the division of Sampson's fleet which was only prevented by the recalcitrance of the admiral on the spot. But it is not likely he could have prevaricated for another eight or nine months until next spring.
There's also the fact that what was left of Sampson's fleet would run the risk of being destroyed in a storm come the autumn hurricane season, as a hurricane actually did hit in September. The blockade would have to be lifted so that the ships could find shelter in Guantánamo, thereby allowing Cervera the opportunity to slip out of Santiago and seek refuge in Havana. If that happened, Shafter's success or failure at Santiago would in either case fail to achieve the primary objective of the US government, the destruction of Cervera. His expedition would have been in vain.
As it were, Escario arrived just barely too late, and this was primarily on account of the wasted several days in contesting points along his route with the numerous guerrillas that stalked the Sierra Maestra. These indigenous insurgents proved very valuable to the US, though they operated independently, indeed beyond even the knowledge, of the Americans.
In no better way could the vulnerability of Cervera at Santiago be more vividly illustrated. General Linares's closest reinforcements were not available to him by railway, unlike the garrisons in the harbours in the west of the island. They had to march through rebel territory using bad roads, with several river lines that were held against them. It therefore took nearly two weeks for Escario to reach Santiago.
Even so it was an impressive display of endurance. Escario and his men covered nearly one-hundred and twenty miles through hostile country in the same time it took the American forces to move from their beachheads to Santiago, distances that were even at their greatest less than twenty miles.
Investigating Escario's movement is doubly interesting because Sampson's perceptive judgement again saved the day for the Americans. The expedition assembled for invasion in Tampa Bay was ordered to sail on 8 June. But soon afterwards the Navy Department received word that there were hostile cruisers in the Windward Passage, based on a false sighting.They were ordered back to Florida. Sampson, on his own initiative, ordered them back out again on the 14th.
On the 20th they had joined Sampson outside Santiago, and, as related earlier, between the 22nd and 25th were landed to the east of the Spanish base. Sampson had immediately discounted, correctly, the possibility of cruisers being inthe Windward Passage and had rushed the troops to where they needed to be. His prompt action therefore saved a few days, a few days which might have allowed Escario to arrive and tilt the balance against the Americans at San Juan Hill and El Caney.
As tight of a corner as the US was turning, they pulled it off. Santiago was invested just as Escario arrived, with the forces of Linares decisively defeated two days before. With this information it appears that Cervera concluded that Santiago was doomed. He could not long remain.
Yet, he had no intention of waiting until last minute when the harbour fell and being given no other choice but to leave. This was because his attempt to sortie would be predictable and anticipated by his enemy's dispositions.
So instead, Cervera gambled on a bold move. While the American troops crept towards Santiago, he readied his ships for a breakout. On the early morning of 3 July, Sampson, not expecting any trouble that day, left with the New York to confer with Shafter on the beach of Siboney. That same morning the battleship Massachusetts left the blockade to take on coal.
This left Schley in command with the four remaining battleships, the Texas, Oregon, Iowa, and Indiana, together with his own heavy cruiser, the Brooklyn. The last of which being the only ship that could catch Cervera if he slipped the blockade.
Bearing this consideration in mind, Cervera decided to launch a sudden surprise assault upon Schley in the Brooklyn. Once that was sunk or disabled, the Spanish fleet could run for it. Once they were clear of the American blockade they could enter Havana or Cienfuegos long before the Americans could stop them, and the game would start over again.
The chances of this succeeding were reasonably favourable. If forced to stand and fight, Cervera would probably lose. But for that very reason he had no intention of precipitating a general action, not for long anyway.
Cervera himself, in the Infanta Maria Teresa leading the van, immediately engaged theBrooklyn directly. A duel began between the two flagships, until the slower Texas was able to come up against Cervera. His ship was pounded heavily and he ran it aground, hoping that his sacrifice would allow the others to escape.
Tragically, they did not. The Almirante Oquendo was very unfortunately struck by the Iowa, which caused a boiler explosion and sent her to the bottom. The Vizcaya was pursued by the Brooklyn supported by the Texas. She was struck repeatedly and gave a good showing of herself by a sustained resistance, but the Americans drove her in towards the shore, where her captain struck his colours before running her onto the beach.
Apart from the destroyers, all the remained of Cervera's squadron was the Cristóbal Colón. This ship was regarded as the fastest in either fleet, and had managed to outrun theBrooklyn. But she was caught by the Oregon, whose range was sufficient to hit her, when she was forced to make a southward move to avoid a peninsula jutting across her path. This change of direction slowed her down and presented a larger target, giving just enough time for the Oregon to make her influence felt. Damaged and no longer able to run, Captain Emilio Diaz struck his colours and scuttled his ship in the estuary of the River Tarquino.
The Spaniards had fought brilliantly and heroically, but that day they were particularly unlucky, despite the clever tactic employed by their commander, and the noble sacrifice of his own ship. The entire squadron was lost, Spain hadbeen defeated. The game was up.
Realising this, the Spanish government recalled Cámara, who had only the day before the defeat, it will be recalled, passed the Suez Canal. With the loss of the Caribbean Squadron there was now nothing to stop the Americans from capturing Cuba and Puerto Rico by blockade. Santiago fell on 17 July. Afterwards, on the 23rd, over three-thousand American troops were re-embarked on transports and plans were made to move on Havana, eventually to be landed in Puerto Rico on the 25th instead.
Recognising the futility of further resistance, Spain capitulated and requested terms. These involved the surrender of the Philippes, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Cuba to the United States. Spain's days as an imperial power in the Americas and Pacific were over.
At this point it would do well to recap some salient principles in regards to which this war serves to instruct.
The first principle is that a navy should always be concentrated as far as possible within interior lines. Both navies violated this by foolishly separating their fleets between two, or in the case of the Americans, three, detachments. That Spain was unable to take advantage of this was lucky for the US, and in no way evidence of superior foresight for the latter, who indeed took far longer to concentrate than they should have.
Secondly, once the primary object of the war has been determined, it should be pursued with clarity and unfliching determination. Tertiary objectives, like Sampson's demonstration before San Juan, ought to be avoided. Cervera's purpose was the raising of the blockade, which later became the anchoring the US fleet in place to give Cámara his chance and he, from first to last, fixed upon these with commendable dexterity. Sampson only belatedly adopted his opponent's superior strategic vision.
Thirdly, the primary object and the highest priority in a war heavily dependent upon sea power should be the destruction of the enemy fleet. Once this is achieved everything else can be attempted. If you undertake operations while his fleet still exists, you run risks of these operations being obliterated in detail.
Next, the fleet-in-being strategy is a powerful weapon available to inferior fleets, and this is best employed from the safety of a sheltered inlet. So long as the fleet exists, the enemy cannot freely employ his superiority for achieving secondary goals. Cervera's withdrawal into Santiago ensured that Sampson could not destroy him, and failing that, Sampson would be risking everything by dividing his forces while Cervera yet remained afloat. To
his credit, Sampson at length recognised precisely this fact and clung to it with all his mental and material resources.
Finally, when the inferior enemy fleet-in-being is safely ensconced within its harbour, every effort should be made to extricate it in order to force it into a decisive showdown. Cervera, unfortunately, settled with Santiago when the possibility of reaching Cienfuegos, or even Havana, lay before him. This was a grave strategic blunder. Santiago was by far the most vulnerable to amphibious operations of the ports at his disposal. It was only the danger to Santiago from land-based artillery that forced Cervera out, and it is difficult to see how he would have been forced out of Havana or Cienfuegos that year had he sought safety in either of them.
These principles are interesting to note because they were learned and employed in later conflicts.
During the Russo-Japanese War the Russian Admiral Stepan Makarov played the role of Cervera. He retained his fleet in hand at Port Arthur. So long as this existed Japan was at risk, but Japanese forces landed on the Liaotung Peninsula to drive the Russians out of their base into the open sea, where they were destroyed.
This was more difficult to achieve during the First World War. The Austrian base at Pola, and the German base at Wilhelmshaven, were too secure. Troops could not be landed to force them out. As a result the British and Italian fleets were locked in place for the entire duration of the conflict, which may have been taken advantage of, as Cámara attempted in relation to Sampson's fleet, if there were anyone willing to do so.
All in all, the Spanish, despite their initial mistakes, gradually had developed a solid strategy based around forcing their opponent into excentric movements. The evidence suggests the only reason this did not happen was because of sampson's fortitude. Cervera also chose Santiago when he might have chosen another port. Even so, Cervera's decision may not have cost Spain the war had the rebels not delayed Escario, or if Sampson had not collected the troops in Tampa Bay himself, or if the sacrifice of the Infanta Maria Teresa had succeeded in allowing the other Spanish ships to escape.
Therefore we can conclude this work by stating that Spain was not feeble and weak, att least, not in comparison to its American opponent. Spain had reasonable chances of success, had different developments prevailed. The deduction one is left with is that the US won as a result of Sampson's clear, if belated, grasp of strategic principles, and the good fortune attendent upon American arms, rather than upon the weakness and ineptitude of Spain.
The maps show the various geographic realities discussed in the narrative. The first map shows the positions of the two sides, and their movements ending with Cervera's imprisonment in Santiago, with the green lines representing the concentric movements combining Cámara and Cervera that Spain should have ordered at the outset of hostilities. Purple represents Portuguese territory, blue represents French territory, orange represents Dutch territory, red represents American territory and movements, yellow represents Spanish territory and movements.
The second map shows the belt of fortifications built by General Campos, and expanded by General Weyler, that divided Cuba in two.
The third map shows the route take by Colonel Escario in his rush to reinforce the garrison of Santiago, and the positions of the American landing sites to show their relative distance from Santiago de Cuba.
The fourth map displays the defensive advantages of Santiago and why the American fleet was unable to simply rush into the harbour and sink Cervera there, which will be briefly explained below.
There is a great deal of distance to cover in very narrow waters. Given that the outer roadsteads could be protected by a combination of torpedo launchers, sea mines, and shore-based artillery, the chances of large cumbrous battleships reaching the inner harbour were about nil, and those that survived would yet have to face the fire of the Spanish squadron, in addition to the other defences, if they did make it that far.
For this reason Sampson rejected out of hand any suggestion of attempting to penetrate Santiago with warships. It was a task only troops could perform. The yellow circle represents the guarded inner sanctum where Cervera could retire to, while the red circle outlines the murderously close range shore defences would operate from, and the great length the ships would have to traverse to reach Cervera.
Given the narrowness of the channels, this would also force the ships into double, or even single file lines, which would be doubly prudent given the extensive mining of the channels. The necessity of avoiding mines would also slow the advance of the squadron, and if the ship ahead or behind started to list, it would block the forward movement of those behind or in front.
So basically the American ships would have been faced with the choice of either rushing ahead to run into mines, which would sink them, or else to creep around the mines carefully, which would make easy targets for torpedoes and cannons on shore, which would sink them. Not to mention possibly being trapped within the channels by their own damaged ships in the rear or van. Or in short, the very real possibility of losing their entire fleet before they even saw the Spanish ships.
- Kaiser
