What would happen should Turkey war with Greece, who would win?

Wednesday, 4 June 2014

As a sort of adjunct to that latest note (see: http://goo.gl/2AXmdT), I decided to examine a possible course of war between Turkey and Greece in our own time. A prospect that is sometimes discussed by lunatic Balkanites on Facebook, as is their wont to do. But while dismissing the more fantastic of these dreams, it would be interesting to evaluate more modest pretensions entertained by the two states.

The primary rival and most likely enemy of Greece is, of course, the Republic of Turkey.

In raw statistical terms, it would appear that Greece has little chance in a war against her gargantuan neighbour. With a population of over seventy millions and a GDP of $788 billion compared to Greece's barely over ten millions of population and a GDP of $249 billion, it would appear that Turkey would be the clear victor.

This view is seemingly further supported by the Greek defeat in the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922. But this setback should be understood in context.

During that conflict the Greeks by virtue of the Treaty of Sévres had acquired part of Ionia and Lydia, around the city of Smyrna in Anatolia. They rashly attempted to march on Ankara to force the Turkish Republic, which had repudiated Sévres, to recognise these losses.

Their ascent onto the Anatolian Plateau resulted in their defeat and evacuation of the peninsula. They were then compelled to accept the Treaty of Lausanne, establishing Turkey's current borders (except Hatay).

While Greece clearly failed to retain any territory in Anatolia or penetrate into the interior of the peninsula, the Turks had not destroyed her army or invaded her territory in retaliation. Turkey's victory was an entirely defensive one.

So we understand that that example would have little relevance in a war fought for offensive purposes.

The current dispute between the two nations involves the sovereignty of the island of Cyprus, and to a lesser extent the territorial waters of Greece's Aegean islands and the smaller islands of Imbros and Tenedos.

As such, the competition between the two will involve a maritime contest, the victor of which would be able to seize the contentious islands at their leisure.

Now, it is hardly to be conceived that Greece could successfully invade Anatolia. They proved incapable even when the Turks were in chaos and when the gap between the two powers was much more narrow than it is now.

But one might argue that Turkey would seek to use her numerical superiority to coerce Greece by striking her on the landward side. A direct invasion by land of Greece from Turkish Thrace would be an incredibly difficult undertaking.

Besides all of the passes I mentioned in my latest note shielding the interior of Greece, even entering the outlying fringe would be difficult.

The Greco-Turkish border is delimited by the Maritsa and the Arda, which river lines Greece might attempt to contest. If not, there's a much better position to the west.

As the Rhodopes curve south to reach the Aegean just west of the Maritsa, they form the mountainous region of Evros, the ridge visible on the map.

The only road over this ridge is along the pass of Makri, to the west of Alexandroupoli. As the Turks can go no other way, the Greeks could prepare for them there.

Presuming they'd force this, the Turks would then have to continue west through Komotini moving between Lake Vistonida and the Rhodopes, with the River Kompsatos forming a barrier in the narrow neck of land, forming an extremely defensible chokepoint.

Moving west from here through Xanthi, they could either move by way of the Mesta or hug the coast through Kavala and the Kavala Pass, but either way they'd have to move north or south of Mount Lekanis, which movement would be easily impeded by the Greeks on the heights of the mountain.

Meaning that the Turks would have to take the mountain before continuing west.

Moving west from there the main road passes between the Pangaeum Mountains, but if the Turks wished to move through wider passages they could go north passing between the Rhodopes and Pagaeum by the valley of the Aggitis to its confluence with the Struma.

Presuming the southern route is taken, the path continues west between Mount Cerdyllium and Mount Stratonicus, skirting either north or south of Lake Volvi where the paths between Mount Volvi and Lake Volvi to the north, and Mount Stratonicus and Lake Volvi to the south are very narrow.

Continuing west from Lake Volvi the Turks would run into Lake Coronea, having to pass north of that lake between it and Mount Vertiscus, or south between the lake and Mount Choriatis, before finally reaching the valley of the Vardar and Salonica.

If, instead, the Turks passed north of Mount Pangaeum to follow the Aggitis to the valley of the Struma, they could deploy widely in the plains formed by that river, but the Greeks would be able to hold the narrow route commanding their exit.

The Turks would have to pass between Mount Belasica (north) and Mount Krousia (south), just west of the Rupel Gorge.

Nestled between the mountains is Lake Kerkini, the only practical route around which is to the north. Presupposing that the Turks succeed in crossing this path, they'd run into Lake Dojran.

It would be necessary to pass between the eastern shore of this lake and the western slopes of Mount Krousia, which at last would bring the Turks to the valley of the Vardar and the plains of Macedonia.

After which they could pass either between Mount Olympus and Mount Ossa by the Vale of Tempe or between Mount Vermium and Mount Olympus by the valley of the Aliacmon to reach the plains of Thessaly and thus the regions outlined in the note.

I would consider it highly unlikely that the Turks would ever succeed in even reaching the plains of Macedonia, let alone Thessaly, with a landward assault, even in great superiority.

On the other hand, it would be a different story if the Turks gained control of the sea with a shattering naval victory. They could bypass much of the Greeks' defences, and they could overrun Cyprus along with any Aegean island.

Now one might think that Turkey's superior wealth and population would ensure her supremacy of the seas, but would it really? It remains to be seen.

Suffice to say that the Greeks would have an honest chance, or even would be favoured to defeat the Turks at sea. Since achieving independence, the Greeks have dominated the Aegean in every conflict between themselves and the Turks.

Indeed the Turks were so petrified of facing the Greeks on the waves that they only ever fought two major engagements with them after 1830, at Elli and Lemnos, in both of which the Turks fled to safety as soon as the Greeks concentrated fire on them. After these defeats the Turks did not dare to again contest the Greek fleet, preferring to cringe in the security of the Propontis.

History does not much favour the Turks, as the Greeks are both better sailors and have generally better craft. In a major fleet engagement I'd be surprised if the victory didn't go to the Greeks.

In the event of Greece defeating the Turks at sea, they would be able to seize the whole of Cyprus, and would simultaneously virtually remove any danger of a Turkish invasion of the Greek mainland, for that would require such routes as we've traced out.

Naturally, therefore, the Turks are not at all eager to challenge the Greeks, who have always been superior to them at sea. Recent reform and determined naval programmes may allow the Turks to prevail, but it would be difficult on account of an ingrained inferiority complex such as that which had paralysed the French in their wars against the British.

So while a Greek invasion of Anatolia or dreams to regain Constantinople are the delusions of fools, it would be incorrect to state that Greece has no chance against Turkey in a war regarding more limited aims.

Greek statesman have little time for Constantinople or dreams of restoring the Byzantine Empire. But a cardinal point of their foreign policy is Cyprus, either to restore the legitimate government's sovereignty over the entire island, or, if possible, to annex it to Greece.

This ambition is entirely within their power to achieve, provided they could successfully impose a marked ascendancy over the Turkish Navy. Given that the Greeks have done so in every conflict between the two since 1821, it would be very odd to argue that they cannot do so now.

The map is small scale, so it might be difficult to see. But the necessary route of advance is in yellow, while the relevant mountains are labelled in green and the lakes are in blue.